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ABSTRACT 
The European Union (“EU”) is the most significant trade partner of the 
United States.  Trading in goods protected by intellectual property rights remains a 
challenge for American business entities as they are forced to sift through a myriad 
of law consisting of the federal intellectual property law of the EU and the 
intellectual property law of the member states.  The European Court of Justice 
(“ECJ” or “the Court”) has been faced with dozens of complex cases arising out of 
conflicts between the national law of the member states and the Articles of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU” or “the Treaty”) that 
mandate the free movement of goods across national lines as one of the TFEU’s 
fundamental purposes.  This work presents the pertinent issues that arise in 
conflicts between the two bodies of law, and provides a thorough explanation and 
analysis of the case law of the ECJ on the issue of intellectual property rights and 
the free movement of goods. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Importance of Understanding European Union Law and 
International Trade Law 
The incentive for Americans or those interested in the area of international 
trade to study EU law lies, at the very least, in the fact that the EU is the largest 
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trading partner of the United States.1  Individually, Germany, France, and the 
United Kingdom are within the top ten trading partners of the United States.2  
Professor Daniel C.K. Chow has commented that anyone interested in the area of 
international trade cannot ignore the EU.3  Chow has also remarked that the EU is 
at the forefront of many emerging international trade issues involving intellectual 
property rights.4  Unfortunately, fewer law schools are offering courses on EU law 
in their curriculums.5   
Globally, the theory of comparative advantage has found its way into 
international law, and has helped develop a body of trade law suggesting that 
sovereign governments integrate their economies.  It can also be argued that the 
EU serves as the best example of this type of integration in the modern era.6  There 
are several benefits that economic integration and international trade law bring to 
the world.  The advantages of free trade include a refined division of labor, higher 
real incomes, and greater cross-cultural understanding, all of which in turn bring 
greater prospects for peace.7  As international trade law develops to create rules for 
economic integration, people, firms, and countries that are party to agreements 
creating integration are able to make decisions in a more predictable manner.8   
Despite the well-known benefits of economic integration, international trade 
law is required in order to force cooperation between countries since cooperation 
will not exist if countries are left to their specific interests.9  Indeed, the incentive 
for a country to block imports if they pose real or perceived threats to domestic 
industries is significant, and without international trade law forcing rule 
recognition by countries seeking to join their economies, economic integration will 
never become a reality.10  However, international trade law is an evolving body of 
law, inside and outside the EU, and one of the most compelling issues within 
international trade law is the balance between the assertion of intellectual property 
rights, on the one hand, and undistorted competition and the free movement of 
goods, on the other hand.11 
                                                
1 Daniela Caruso, EU Law in U.S. Legal Academia, 20 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 175, 176–77 
(2011). 
2 PAUL KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
13 (8th ed. 2009). 
3 DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: PROBLEMS, 
CASES, AND MATERIALS 124 (2008). 
4 Id. 
5 PAUL D’ANIERI, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: POWER AND PURPOSE IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS 178 (1st 
ed. 2010). 
6 Id. at 249. 
7 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 3, at 32, 35. 
8 KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 2, at 575. 
9 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 3, at 6. 
10 Id. 
11 Mauro Squitieri, Refusals to License Under European Union Competition Law After Microsoft, 
11 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 65, 65 (2012). 
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B. The European Union 
The EU possesses 455 million people, accounts for 28% of global gross 
domestic product, and 20% of global trade.12  Professor Malcolm N. Shaw has 
labeled the EU as the most important European organization.13  The EU also 
represents all of its member states at the World Trade Organization.14 
The EU’s creation was supported by a goal of keeping the continent out of 
war, and a belief that the best way to achieve that goal was to force member state 
countries to integrate their economies.15  This level of economic integration 
included removing internal trade barriers and allowing for the free movement of 
goods, services, capital, and labor to complete the dream of a common market.16  
However, the framers of the EU also believed that a common market could allow 
European member states to compete at a higher level economically in a postwar 
economy.17   
A common market, by definition, requires the free flow of goods, services, 
capital, and labor and, in the case of the EU, has also led to the harmonization of 
standards in education, health, safety, social security, and intellectual property 
rights.18  For the common market to be successful, each new member state, and 
even the existing member states, must make changes to its domestic laws, such as 
laws governing intellectual property rights, competition, and the free movement of 
goods, so that trade barriers cease to exist unless explicitly allowed by the Treaty.19  
This attempt at harmonization has been difficult, especially in regard to merging 
the former Soviet bloc countries—where intellectual property rights were viewed 
quite differently—into the EU.20  Each revision of the Treaty that governs the 
operations of the EU, beginning with the Treaty of Rome in 1957, has required 
greater integration and more powers moved from the national governments to the 
EU.21  Despite the current financial crisis and the aforementioned challenges, the 
EU is still the most successful common market in the world.22 
There are four principal areas of EU law including the Treaty, Regulations, 
Directives, and Decision; the Treaty, Regulations, and Decisions have a direct 
                                                
12 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 3, at 124. 
13 MALCOLM  N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1172 (5th ed. 2003). 
14 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 3, at 124. 
15 D’ANIERI, supra note 5, at 129. 
16 SHAW, supra note 13, at 1173. 
17 Emily Bolton, Defining Genuine Use Requirements of Community Trade Marks in Light of an 
Expanding European Union, 27 CONN. J. INT’L L. 371, 373 (2012). 
18 THEODORE H. COHN, GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 210 (5th ed. 
2010). 
19 Guido Ricci, Copyright Protection in Poland, Czech and Slovak Republics and in Hungary, 
1994 INT’L BUS. L.J. 81, 81. 
20 Id. 
21 Julien Chaisse, Promises and Pitfalls of the European Union Policy on Foreign Investment—
How Will the New EU Competence on FDI Affect the Emerging Global Regime, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 
51, 52 (2012). 
22 David A. Gantz, World Trade Law After Doha: Multilateral, Regional, and National 
Approaches, 40 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 321, 344 (2012). 
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effect, and thus, member states need not write legislation to implement those forms 
of law.23  Directives do not have a direct effect, and thus, member states have some 
leeway to implement those requirements.24  Specific to the subject matter of this 
work, the purposes of the Directives have been to prevent the conflict in national 
laws in the areas of intellectual property use, registration, licensing, and 
exhaustion, so that the free movement of goods is not impaired.25  In turn, the 
European Commission has a mission to govern for the benefit of all twenty-seven 
member states and this includes the duty of hearing complaints that have been 
infringed by member state legislation or action and issuing decisions to remediate 
infringements.26  Additional Directives have been crafted when the Treaty, 
decisions from the Commission, and decisions from the ECJ have not been 
enough.27 
The ECJ is the judicial organ of the EU.  Decisions by the ECJ are directly 
applicable to the member states, courts of the member states, and parties operating 
inside the EU.28  The ECJ has been characterized as similar in function to the 
United States Supreme Court, in regard to the latter’s relationship to state courts, 
as the ECJ is the final arbiter of disputes on the subject of EU law.29  Most 
importantly, the ECJ has held that all EU law is superior to national law, even 
domestic constitutional law, and this decision has remarkably been adhered to by 
the member states in the same fashion that the United States Supreme Court 
decisions have been adhered to by American states.30 
C. Influence of the European Union on International Trade 
The successful economic integration of the EU since its creation in 1957 
cannot be underestimated.  Today, the European Economic Area (“EEA”), which 
comprises the twenty-seven member states of the EU and an additional three 
countries,31 rivals the United States as an economic power.32  In 1975, the EU’s 
Lome Convention provided special trade relations between the EU member states 
and sixty-eight former colonies.33  Furthermore, the EU continues to show a desire 
                                                
23 SHAW, supra note 13, at 162. 
24 Id. 
25 Daniel R. Bereskin, Anti-Dilution/Anti-Free-Riding Laws in the United States, Canada, and the 
EU: Bridges Too Far?, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 1710, 1743–44 (2011). 
26 D’ANIERI, supra note 5, 349–50. 
27 Bolton, supra note 17, at 375. 
28 SHAW, supra note 13, at 142. 
29 D’ANIERI, supra note 5, at 350. 
30 See, e.g., Case 6/64 Costa v. Ente Nazional per L’Energia Elettrica, 1964 E.C.R. 585.  The ECJ 
held in this landmark decision that European Union law cannot be overridden by domestic legal 
procedures. 
31 DOMINICK SALVATORE, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 334 (8th ed. 2004).  The additional three 
countries include Norway, Iceland, and Lichtenstien.  Id.  Switzerland is the only country that is part of 
the European Free Trade Area but is not a member of the EEA.  Id. 
32 JOAN E. SPERO & JEFFREY A. HART, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 4 
(7th ed. 2010). 
33 MORDECHAI E. KREININ, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: A POLICY APPROACH 138 (10th ed. 
2006). 
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to develop additional trade agreements with Central and Eastern European 
countries and allow for the eventual entry of those countries into the EU.34  Indeed, 
the possibility of entry into the EU has forced many non-member states in Europe 
to follow EU law, thus, further extending the reach of this body of law.35  
Additionally, the EU, as recently as 2011, discussed opening its common market to 
Canada and other countries that at one time were colonies of the EU member states 
and were not part of the Lome Convention.36  There has also been some discussion 
of a free trade agreement between the EU and the United States.37 
The success of the European common market has pushed other major powers 
into trade agreements with countries that have less powerful profiles.38  There is 
evidence that the partnership between the countries making up the North American 
Free Trade Agreement was birthed due to the concern over, and lust for, the EU’s 
success.39  The same concerns have led to discussions among countries in the 
Western Hemisphere to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (“FTAA”).40  
The development of a FTAA, in conjunction with the EEA, could lead to the world 
experiencing three large trading blocs, including a large Asian trade group.41 
Not all attempts at economic integration around the globe have been 
successful.  Mercosur, a regional trade bloc including Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, 
and Uruguay, has not been successful in moving from a customs union to a 
common market largely due to protectionist infighting and the failure to create the 
necessary inter-governmental institutions.42  There is also some comment that the 
EU may not be able to sufficiently adopt additional member states.43 
D. Differences between the European Union and the United States 
Both the EU and the United States have an understanding that a country’s 
level of competitiveness is based on its ability to innovate.44  Despite the 
agreement between the two trade partners on the need to push for innovation, there 
are differences between them as to how to regulate the balance between intellectual 
property rights and the free movement of goods.  Firms operating in the EU and 
the United States must carefully calculate their behavior in each market due to the 
stark differences in the law governing the exercise of intellectual property rights in 
the face of competition law.45  Bluntly, there is a greater risk of being charged with 
                                                
34 SPERO & HART, supra note 32, at 100. 
35 Id. at 44. 
36 Gantz, supra note 22, at 352. 
37 Id. at 357. 
38 SPERO & HART, supra note 32, at 112. 
39 THOMAS OATLEY, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 43 (4th ed. 2010). 
40 SPERO & HART, supra note 32, at 112. 
41 OATLEY, supra note 39, at 43. 
42 Gantz, supra note 22, at 346–47. 
43 KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 2, at 589. 
44 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 3, at 200. 
45 Renata B. Hesse, Counseling Clients on Refusal to Supply Issues in the Wake of the EC 
Microsoft Case, 22 ANTITRUST, Spring 2008, at 32, 35. 
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anti-competitive behavior in the EU.46  This risk could lead to a lessening of 
intellectual property rights.47 
Furthermore, within the specific scope of intellectual property rights, there 
are differences between the EU and the United States.  For example, in the area of 
trademark law, rights to a trademark are registration-based in the EU whereas in 
the United States, trademark rights are use-based.48  In total, the difference in the 
law between the two trade partners has created an appreciable effect on market 
prices in many areas of commerce, such as the pharmaceutical industry.49  In the 
EU individual countries set pharmaceutical prices and have enacted laws that allow 
governments to curb intellectual property rights to make such purchases easier.50  
In contrast, stronger intellectual property rights are found in the United States, 
which also allows its private sector health care system to set the prices of 
pharmaceuticals.51 
The EU has struggled to find a uniform, federal-style law that harmonizes 
the balance between intellectual property rights and the free movement of goods 
and competition law that is necessary to integrate the economies of twenty-seven 
member states.52  One can only imagine the problems presented in trying to bridge 
the legal gap between the entire EU and the United States on this issue.  There was 
an attempt by the two trade partners to resolve extraterritorial conflicts in the area 
of trade law in 1991, but the ECJ struck down the agreement as an ultra vires act 
by the European Commission.53  Regardless of the legal gap that remains, the two 
trade partners are likely to keep significant trade relations due to geography, 
culture, language, and political interests.54 
E. The Purpose of This Work 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the balance the EU has crafted 
between the protection of intellectual property rights, on one hand, and the Treaty-
based preference for the free movement of goods and undistorted competition, on 
the other hand.  This work will begin by briefly exploring the applicable provisions 
of the Treaty involved in this balance, followed by a discussion of the exhaustion 
of rights doctrine.  Most of this work will be dedicated to the case law from the 
ECJ that provides the reader with a detailed sense of the balance based on the 
pertinent facts of each case and the associated holdings of the ECJ. 
                                                
46 Id.  
47 Id.  
48 Bolton, supra note 17, at 384. 
49 Silvio Cappellari, Reverse Payment Settlements in the EU—Finding the Right Dosage, 7 
COMPETITION L. INT’L, no. 2, 2011, at 27, 31. 
50 Id. at 27. 
51 Id. at 28. 
52 Squitieri, supra note 11, at 77. 
53 SHAW, supra note 13, at 618. 
54 KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 2, at 16. 
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II. APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION 
Advocate General Federico Mancini of the ECJ commenting on the debate 
between the free movement of goods and the recognition of intellectual property 
rights, stated in Pharmon BV v. Hoechst AG:  
The questions formulated . . . provide the Court with another opportunity to 
consider one of the most interesting and complex issues of Community law.  
Essentially the Court is asked to balance the requirements of the free movement of 
goods against the need to protect the industrial property rights and commercial 
guarantees provided for in the legal orders of the Member States.55 
The Treaty placed member states in a position whereby they forfeited their 
individual power to act as autonomous actors in the sphere of trade as early as 
1952 with the ratification of the Treaty creating the European Coal and Steel 
Community.56  Any discussion of the legal framework of the EU’s common market 
should begin with Article 18’s prohibition on discrimination based on nationality.57  
Article 18’s general prohibition applies to goods, services, capital, and labor and is 
often cited by firms and member states claiming that another member state has 
written protectionist legislation.58  Article 18 also gives the European government 
the power to write regulations and directives that are more specific in nature in an 
attempt to combat nationality discrimination.59  In matters involving intellectual 
property rights, Article 18 is often cited by those arguing discrimination based on 
the country of origin of the goods.60 
The drafters of the Amsterdam Treaty made sure to maintain the balance 
between the uninterrupted free trade of goods and services and the protection of 
intellectual property rights.  Article 34 states that there can be no restrictions on 
imports by member states.61  Likewise, Article 35 prohibits the same restrictions 
on exports, although this Article is rarely invoked in this debate.62  The free 
movement of goods is further protected by Article 101, which prohibits trade 
agreements between business associations or member states that fix prices, limit 
                                                
55 Case 19/84, Pharmon BV v. Hoechst AG, 1985 E.C.R. 2281, 2282. 
56 Sophie Meunier & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Who Speaks for Europe? The Delegation of Trade 
Authority in the EU, 37 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 477, 479 n.1 (1999). 
57 Article 18 of the Treaty states: “Within the scope of application of the Treaties, and without 
prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall 
be prohibited.  The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure, may adopt rules designed to prohibit such discrimination.”  Consolidated Version 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 34, March 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 53) 1.61 
[hereinafter TFEU]. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60  See, e.g., Case 15/81, Gaston Schul Douane Expediteur BV v. Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en 
Accijnzen, 1982 E.C.R. 1409, 1418, 1428–29 (referring to EEC Treaty Article 12 [now TFEU Article 
18]).   
61 Article 34 states: “Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect 
shall be prohibited between Member States.”  TFEU art. 34. 
62 Article 35 states: “Quantitative restrictions on exports, and all measures having equivalent 
effect, shall be prohibited between Member States.”  TFEU art. 35. 
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production, and restrict sources of supply and many other commercial activities.63  
Additionally, Article 102 prohibits a business entity from abusing a “dominant 
position” in the marketplace, and enumerates conditions that constitute the abuse 
of a dominant position.64  Article 102 provides for powerful remedies that force a 
member state or a firm to change its business practices.65  Article 102 has been 
                                                
63 Article 101 states: 
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which 
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition within the common market, and in particular those which: 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading 
conditions; 
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or 
investment; 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to 
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be 
automatically void. 
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the 
case of: 
—any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings; 
—any decision or category of decisions by associations of 
undertakings; 
—any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, 
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of 
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing 
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:  
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not 
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; 
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in 
respect of a substantial  part of the products in question. 
TFEU art. 101.   
64 Article 102 states: 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
[common] market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible 
with the [common] market insofar as it may affect trade between Member States. 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other 
unfair trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice 
of consumers;  
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other 
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;  
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to 
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
TFEU art. 102. 
65 Ian S. Forrester, Article 82: Remedies in Search of Theories?, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 919, 948 
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labeled by at least one academic as having a strong sense of morality attached to it 
and being distinctively European in application.66  As stated above, the free 
movement of services is protected by Article 56, which prohibits restrictions by 
member states on the nationals of the member states who perform such services.67  
Article 56 goes as far as allowing the European Council and the Commission to 
extend this principle to nationals of non-member states.68  Furthermore, Article 56 
provides rights and limitations to both broadcasters and recipients of broadcasted 
materials.69 
The above articles of the TFEU are balanced by Article 36, which allows 
exceptions to Articles 34 and 35, including the ability of member states to protect 
intellectual property.70  Therefore, if one were to keep a scorecard of sorts, Articles 
34, 35, 56, 101, and 102 are cited by parties believing that intellectual property 
rights asserted by right holders infringe upon the EU Treaty policy of unrestricted 
free movement of goods and services and undistorted competition (together, “trade 
restraint”).  In contrast, Article 36 is cited by rights holders and member states 
arguing that an intellectual property right granted by one state must be recognized 
by another state.71 
                                                
(2005). 
66 Id. at 919. 
67 Article 56 states:  
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on freedom to 
provide services within the [Community] shall be prohibited in respect of 
nationals of Member States who are established in a Member State other than that 
of the person for whom the services are intended. 
The European Parliament and the Council acting in accordance with ordinary 
legislative procedure, may extend the provisions of the Chapter to nationals of a 
third country who provide services and who are established within the 
[Community]. 
TFEU art. 56.  
68 Id. 
69 Astrid Janssen, Copyright Licensing Revisited, 13 GERMAN L.J. 124, 126 (2012). 
70 Article 36 of the Treaty states: 
The provisions of Articles 34 and 35 shall not preclude prohibitions or 
restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public 
morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of 
humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, 
historic or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial 
property.  Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means 
of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member 
States. 
TFEU art. 36.  Interestingly enough, the United States Patent Act does not allow for morality to play a 
role in the decision of patentability.  See generally Cynthia M. Ho, Splicing Morality and Patent Law: 
Issues Arising from Mixing Mice and Men, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 247, 256 (2000). 
71 Joined Cases C-321–324/94, Pistre, Barthes, Milhau, and Oberti, 1997 E.C.R. I-2360, I-2377. 
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III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EXHAUSTION OF RIGHTS 
DOCTRINE 
A.  The Exhaustion of Rights Doctrine, Generally 
Much of the debate on the balance between the protection of intellectual 
property and the free movement of goods and undistorted competition is centered 
on whether intellectual property rights should exist in all circumstances or whether 
there should be limitations on an intellectual property owner’s assertion of rights.  
However, the debate also centers on how far the intellectual property rights extend 
outside of the member state granting those rights.  This is the exhaustion of rights 
doctrine.72 
At a basic level, the exhaustion of rights doctrine, also known as the “first 
sale doctrine,” prohibits an intellectual property right holder from exercising rights 
over a good or service once it is sold.73  The exhaustion of rights doctrine operates 
much like a physical border.74  The doctrine, as practiced by the ECJ, allows an 
intellectual property right holder to restrict the use, manufacture and sale of the 
protected product within the state that granted that right.75  However, once the right 
holder agrees in some manner to the sale of the protected product in another state, 
the right holder cannot assert his intellectual property right to block the movement 
of the product throughout the other member states or back into the state that 
granted the intellectual property protection (a parallel import).76  Therefore, the 
intellectual property right is “exhausted” at the border once the right holder has 
acquiesced to the sale of the protected product abroad.77  Therefore, the right 
holder must choose between maintaining complete control of the protected product 
domestically or reaping the potential financial rewards of placing the product in the 
markets of other states.  The doctrine, at least in theory, applies to patents, 
trademarks, and copyrights.78  However, there is evidence in the case law that the 
exhaustion of rights doctrine does not apply to goods outside of the EU or EEA, 
although the point remains debatable.79 
Relatedly, it could be argued that under Article 101, any agreement between 
two business associations—such as an intellectual property right holder and a 
distributor—that limits the movement of a good violates the TFEU as an 
agreement in restraint of trade.  Additionally, if the intellectual property right 
holder is successful enough, the right holder may be attacked as abusing a 
dominant position if the right holder attempts to assert his intellectual property 
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right to block the free movement of goods.  Generally, a violation of Article 102 
requires that the intellectual property right holder establish a dominant position in 
the market and that there is an intentional abuse of the dominant market position.80  
In summation, as it has been argued by academics, “EU competition law views all 
licenses as ‘guilty until proven innocent.’”81 
Intellectual property rights are limited to the territoriality principle unless an 
international treaty extends those rights across national borders.82  The territoriality 
principle in an important component of the concept of a common market requiring 
the free movement of goods in that an intellectual property owner can only assert 
rights within the member state that grants the rights, but not beyond that member 
state’s borders.83  Although all member states have accepted the notion of national 
exhaustion of intellectual property rights, the new battleground seems to be 
whether member states should recognize the international exhaustion of 
intellectual property rights.84  The doctrine of international exhaustion, if adopted, 
will allow for the exhaustion of intellectual property rights when the right holder 
has voluntarily placed the protected goods anywhere in the world and the set of 
rights held will be unenforceable in all countries regardless of whether the 
countries involved in the dispute recognized those rights.85  Today, there is 
evidence that member states are pushing for rules allowing for greater international 
exhaustion of intellectual property rights.86  Recently, however, the European 
Parliament rejected the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (“ACTA”) despite 
the fact that all twenty-seven member states had approved the pact.87  The ACTA 
would make it a criminal offense to engage in trademark and copyright 
infringement.88 
Although international exhaustion is not the dominant theory, it seems as if 
the ECJ and the European Commission have gone as far as adopting a form of 
“regional exhaustion” or “Community-based exhaustion” that allows for the 
exhaustion of intellectual property rights once the protected good or service is 
voluntarily placed anywhere in the EU.89  However, there are limitations to the free 
movement of goods, such as in cases whereby the protected goods have been 
stolen and moved across international borders.90  In fact, at the time of this writing, 
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the European Commission is considering adopting criminal penalties for violations 
of intellectual property rights.91 
The ECJ and European Commission have been challenged to harmonize this 
body of law, which requires substantive, nationally-granted intellectual property 
rights to fit into the mold of Treaty Articles 34, 36, 56, 101, and 102.92  This 
challenge is even more intense in regard to technology transfer across borders.93  
However, the theory of “Community-wide” exhaustion of intellectual property 
rights has become the standard for most international trade agreements that address 
these rights.94  But because intellectual property rights are so sensitive, most 
international agreements, if they address intellectual property rights, are silent on 
issue of exhaustion.95  Article 6 of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights specifically states that Articles 3 and 4, which pertain to the all-
important concepts of “national treatment” and “Most-Favored-Nation Treatment,” 
are not to include the concept of exhaustion of intellectual property rights.96  The 
ACTA does not address exhaustion and plainly states that members to that 
agreement need not create special rights or obligations beyond the scope of its 
domestic law.97  The EEA Agreement specifically stated that all member states to 
that agreement must adjust their domestic laws to provide for “regional 
exhaustion.”98  Therefore, “Community-wide” exhaustion principles apply to all 
thirty member states that make up the EEA.99 
B. The Exhaustion of Rights Doctrine in Case Law 
The EU was just over two decades old when the ECJ rendered a far-reaching 
opinion in Donckerwolcke v. Procureur that solidified the concepts of both non-
discrimination and the free movement of goods.100  In a case with ramifications for 
all intellectual property rights, but with a particular focus on trademark 
requirements, the ECJ held that importing member states cannot require a country 
of origin indication beyond the member state country that serves as the exporting 
state.101 
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In Donckerwolcke, Belgian merchants had obtained synthetic cloth that was 
originally derived from Syria and Lebanon and then imported the goods into 
France with only a country of origin indication of Belgium.102  The French 
government prohibited the merchants’ attempt at importation since the import 
certificate did not state Syria or Lebanon.103  The merchants were charged 
criminally under French law.104  The case was referred to the ECJ by the French 
court hearing the appeal. 
According to the ECJ, the French requirement that the “originating” country 
of origin be indicated on the imported goods violated Article 34’s prohibition on 
the domestic laws that restrict trade between member states.105  The ECJ flatly 
stated that the only possible obligation that can be imposed on an importer of 
goods that have been freely placed within the EU is to identify the member state 
that serves as the exporting country and that a member state cannot set 
requirements on an importer to declare an origin other that what it knows or should 
know.106 
In addition to a violation of Article 34, the ECJ also found that the French 
law violated Article 28, which prohibits member states from adopting rules 
intending to create different rules for products with regard to their country of 
origin and depending upon whether the goods originated from a member state or a 
non-member state.107  The Court reasoned that the assimilation of goods freely 
placed in the EU are to be designated as in “free circulation” and must be subject 
to the same rules in regard to the TFEU regardless of whether they were 
manufactured or garnered originally inside or outside the EU.108 
However, counterfeited goods originating from an external country are not 
afforded the same protections.  Article 207 of the TFEU was the source of 
Regulation 3295/94, a predecessor to Regulation 1383/2003, which prohibits the 
release for “free circulation” of goods that are counterfeit or pirated.109  In 
Polo/Ralph Lauren v. Dwidua, the ECJ made several important statements about 
the enforcement power of a member state’s customs authority under Regulation 
3295/94.110   
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In Polo/Ralph Lauren, Dwidua, an Indonesian-based clothing manufacturer 
was accused by Polo/Ralph Lauren of importing into Austria, and then Poland, 
clothing items that violated both verbal and pictorial trademarks owned by the 
latter.111  After a favorable decision by the Austrian court, Polo/Ralph Lauren 
requested that the clothing items be seized by the Austrian authorities and then 
later destroyed at Dwidua’s expense.112  However, the Austrian court was unsure 
as to whether it has jurisdiction to apply Regulation 3295/94 because the 
counterfeit goods were moving from a non-member state to a member state, and 
then on to another non-member state and thus the Austrian government only had 
“temporary custody” of the goods.113 
According to the ECJ, Regulation 3295/94 allows an owner of intellectual 
property rights to file a complaint with the customs authority of the member state 
that comes into contact with the pirated or counterfeit goods when the right holder 
suspects that the goods are pirated or counterfeit, and requires that the right holder 
provide the member state’s customs authority with all pertinent knowledge about 
both the intellectual property rights and the actions of the infringing party.114  The 
member state’s customs authority has the power to seize the goods accused of 
infringement on its own initiative or can seize the goods upon receipt of the right 
holder’s written complaint.115  However, the determination of whether the goods 
are infringing upon the intellectual property rights of the right holder are based on 
the domestic law on the member state that has effectively seized the goods.116 
Three key statements about the power of the EU and its member states to 
combat infringement of intellectual property rights were made by the European 
Court of Justice in the Polo/Ralph Lauren case.  First, the ECJ stated that 
Regulation 3295/94 was designed to prevent the transit of infringing goods even if 
their journey began in a non-member state, continued through a member state, and 
were subject to a final destination in another member state.117  Second, the Court 
stated that the domicile of the right holder was irrelevant in regard to Regulation 
3295/94, and thus, irrelevant to a member state’s enforcement power.118  Third, 
and related to the first statement, a member state’s customs authority does not face 
a limitation in power if the goods passing through the EU are not subject to import 
duties or other charges.119  It also bears mention that the ECJ also took into 
account the duty of member states to combat intellectual property infringement 
under the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) 
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agreement.120 
The Donckerwolcke and Polo/Ralph Lauren cases make it clear that goods 
coming from outside the EU can present unique problems.  The ECJ wrestled with 
another, challenging case involving goods that were believed to be infringing upon 
trademark rights but originated from outside Europe in Class International BV v. 
Colgate-Palmolive Company (“Beecham”).121  Class International was a 
Netherlands-based warehousing firm that brought into the EU toothpaste products 
that it purchased from a South African exporter with the “Aquafresh” trademark, 
which is owned by Beecham and registered by Beecham at the Benelux Trade 
Mark Office.122  Beecham had been informed that the toothpaste products were 
counterfeit and petitioned the Dutch government to seize and search the 
products.123  The Dutch government complied with the request.124  However, after 
an examination of the products, the products were deemed to not to be counterfeit 
and Class International petitioned the Dutch government for both release of the 
goods and an order against Beecham to pay for costs suffered due to the seizure of 
the goods and the Dutch government then referred the case to the ECJ.125 
Again, the Court stated that Article 28 of the Treaty requires that once goods 
originating from outside the EU are released for “free circulation” they become 
“Community goods” and Article 29 of the Treaty requires that goods coming from 
non-EU member states are placed into free circulation once all import formalities 
have been complied with and all customs duties and taxes have been satisfied.126  
Two additional provisions of EU law were at question as well, including Directive 
89/104/EEC and Regulation 40/94.  Directive 89/104/EEC provides that registered 
trademark holders have exclusive rights to their marks that are placed in the course 
of trade and such holders may prohibit the sale, marketing, or importation of 
infringing goods.127  The same Directive, however, does not allow a trademark 
holder to prohibit the use of its mark when the trademarked goods have been 
placed on the market in the EU with the holder’s consent.128  Regulation 2913/92 
creates the EU’s external transit procedure that allows non-EU goods to move 
through the EU without being subject to import duties and other charges.129 
Class International’s first contention was that the toothpaste products that it 
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possessed were not being “imported” but were rather “in transit” at the time the 
goods were brought into the EU and also that, at the time the goods were seized, 
Class International did not have a purchaser.130  Class International also suggested 
that the mere placing of the goods in a warehouse for external transit did not 
constitute an act of using the trademark in the course of trade to which a trademark 
holder could prohibit the further movement of the goods.131 
The ECJ agreed with Class International and held that the mere warehousing 
of trademarked goods pursuant to the external transit procedure would not allow a 
trademark holder to prohibit the movement of trademarked goods through the EU 
by exercising trademark rights under Directive 89/103/EEC.132  The ECJ also 
stated that the mere fact that the trademarked goods were warehoused does not 
mean that they are being “imported,” nor are the trademarks being used in the 
course of trade, so long as the importer has not informed the member state’s 
customs authority that it intends to release the goods into free circulation.133  
According to the Court, it does not matter that there is a mere chance that these 
trademarked products might later be released for free circulation and thus the 
trademark holder cannot prohibit Class International from bringing the goods into 
the EU.134  The ECJ flatly stated that the only way in which a trademark holder can 
block goods from further transit and/or importation is if the possessor-importer of 
the goods has made an express offering for sale of the goods.135 
One last question needed to be resolved by the ECJ in Class International.  
Class International asserted that the party who claims that the trademarked goods 
infringed their rights provided in Directive 89/103/EEC bears the burden of proof 
on this issue.136  In contrast, Beecham stated that the trademark holder should only 
have to prove interference with the mark and, once this is established, the burden 
should shift to the alleged infringing party as to whether infringement of rights 
under the Directive occurred.137  The Court held that the burden of proof to 
establish a violation of rights under the Directive should be placed on the 
trademark holder and not on the alleged infringing party.138  The ECJ furthered its 
remark by indicating the need for a Directive on this particular issue, and for EU 
law generally, warning against a condition whereby, if there were no Directive, 
member states could individually apply the burden of proof, leading to much 
variety in the law.139 
Switzerland is located in the heart of the European continent, but is not part 
of the EU or part of the EEA.  Instead, it sits alone as the one country in the 
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European Free Trade Area not incorporated into either club.  In Kodak AG v. 
Jumbo Markt AG, the Swiss Federal Court decided that Swiss law was also not 
incorporated into the law of either larger club.140  
Kodak AG (“Kodak”) held a Swiss patent on film and began selling that film 
in the United Kingdom, a country that is also a member state of the EU and the 
EEA.141  Jumbo Markt AG had obtained the film and attempted to bring it into 
Switzerland through a parallel import scheme.  Kodak attempted to block the sale 
of the film in Switzerland through the assertion of its Swiss patent rights.142  While 
deciding that Kodak could prohibit the parallel import via Swiss patent rights, the 
Swiss Federal Court wrote at length discussing the differences among the types of 
intellectual property rights and the differences among the law in European 
countries.143 
What made the Kodak decision difficult for the Swiss Federal Court was the 
reality that Swiss statutory law did not address whether Swiss patent rights were 
subject to national exhaustion or international exhaustion.144  After examining the 
law of its European neighbors, the Swiss Federal Court made several conclusions 
about the status of intellectual property rights and the exhaustion of those rights.  
First, the Swiss Federal Court believed that Swiss law was in harmony with the 
doctrine of national exhaustion which, according to the Court, was the dominant 
legal theory.  On the other hand, international exhaustion was a newer legal theory 
and thus a separation of legal theory between Switzerland and the EU was 
possible.145  Second, the Swiss Federal Court decided that although there is a 
movement to treat all intellectual property rights similarly in regard to exhaustion, 
there is reason to treat patent rights on the one hand differently from copyright and 
trademark rights due to the different functions they serve and the intellectual 
achievements they recognize.146  The Swiss Federal Court found that copyright 
protection served to meet aesthetic concerns of the creator while patent rights 
served to meet every day needs and trademark rights served only to allow for 
product identification.147   
The Swiss Federal Court also summarized what it believed to be the status of 
ECJ jurisprudence on the exhaustion principle.  According to the Swiss Court, the 
ECJ has always preferred the free movement of goods to national exhaustion rules 
and has treated all intellectual property rights in similar fashion.148  However, the 
Swiss Federal Court believed that, individually, the member states of the EU were 
of different beliefs in regard to national exhaustion principles and, thus, there was 
no uniform theory on the continent that all intellectual property rights should be 
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addressed similarly in regard to exhaustion.149  The Swiss Court did not believe 
that uniformity on the subject had been achieved through the TRIPS Agreement.150 
Seemingly because of this lack of harmony on the European continent, the 
Swiss Federal Court held that the holder of a Swiss patent should be able to 
prohibit the introduction of a protected product into Switzerland even if that patent 
holder had voluntarily placed the product in the international market place.151  The 
Swiss Federal Court felt no obligation to hold otherwise since there was no 
agreement in place between Switzerland and the EU.152 
C.  Analysis of the Exhaustion of Rights Doctrine. 
The exhaustion of rights doctrine is designed to limit the ability of member 
states to enact barriers to the free movement of goods, even in regard to intellectual 
property rights.  The exhaustion of rights doctrine, as interpreted and applied by 
the ECJ, seems to be an effective check against the ability of a member state to use 
domestic intellectual property rights to promote domestic sales.  However, some 
risks do exist even given the existing law. 
The Donckerwolcke case is quite illustrative.  The French government 
certainly had an incentive to require country of origin labels on goods imported 
from other countries in order to spur consumer sentiment against imports.  
However, if the goods were directly from Belgium, the anti-import sentiment 
would not be as nearly significant in comparison from goods from the Middle East.  
One could only imagine that French consumers might not fret about purchasing 
goods from their close cousins, the Belgians, but might rebel against purchasing 
goods from a third world, non-European country if those same goods competed 
with domestically produced equivalents. 
The ruling in Donckerwolcke also reveals a risk to those who manufacture 
goods within the EEA.  The ECJ essentially allows goods to “pass through” 
member states when the goods are originally made in a non-EEA member state and 
only be subject to a country of origin label designating the EU member state.  
Thus, consumers would not likely know from what country the goods originated.  
This, in turn, would allow importers and exporters the ability to get low-cost goods 
into the EU if a member state with lax import rules will allow entry of the goods.   
Although the ECJ has made it clear, in the cases above and below, that 
substantive intellectual property law is domestic law and suffers from a lack of 
harmony.  The Polo/Ralph Lauren case illustrates a potential problem regarding 
the enforcement of Article 34 in that, since standards for infringement are 
domestic, member states can have different standards for what constitutes patent, 
trademark, or copyright infringement.  Therefore, according to the Polo/Ralph 
Lauren case, member states collectively may have different standards by which 
goods may be seized.  Thus, member states may have an incentive to craft their 
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infringement standards that allow for foreign goods to be seized more often 
making importation more challenging.   
There are only two limitations on this practice.  First, any infringement 
standard must apply equally to goods be they manufactured domestically or in 
another member state.  The second is found in the Class International case where 
the ECJ held that goods seized due to infringement concerns must be placed in 
“free circulation” inside the member state attempting to seize them and merely 
moving them through the member state is not placing the goods in “free 
circulation.” 
The Kodak case poses another threat to the harmonization of “European” 
free movement of goods.  The EU is made up of only twenty-seven of Europe’s 
countries and the EEA is made up of an additional three countries.  Therefore, a 
European country not part of the EU is free to draft and enforce intellectual 
property law as it wishes.  It remains a question as to whether countries not in the 
EEA will continue to adopt national exhaustion principles that allow for the 
blocking of imported goods even if they are voluntarily placed in the market.  
Firms wishing to operate on the European continent must make sure that they 
secure intellectual property rights in all countries in which they do business.  They 
may also take the Kodak case as signifying that they can block parallel imports into 
non-EEA countries that adhere to national exhaustion principles. 
IV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND BARRIERS TO THE FREE MOVEMENT OF 
GOODS 
A. Free Movement, Competition, and Patents 
1. Case Law 
a. Parallel Imports 
One of the first cases involving the balance between intellectual property 
rights and trade restraint to reach the ECJ was Parke, Davis & Co. v. Probel.153  
The plaintiff, Parke-Davis, was an American company that held patents granted by 
Dutch law on a chemical and biological process called chloramphenicol, which is 
used to create antibiotics.154  Several defendant firms bought, marketed, and resold 
the products made from the process without the permission of the plaintiff and 
asserted as a defense Articles 101 and 102.155  The defendants argued that the 
exercise of patent rights under Dutch law by the plaintiff was an agreement in 
violation of Article 101, as an agreement that restricted trade, and a violation of 
Article 102 in that the plaintiff was abusing a dominant position.156 
The ECJ made two separate rulings on the issues arising from Articles 101 
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and 102, both to the favor of the plaintiff.157  First, that Articles 101 and 102 are 
not violated merely because one asserts their rights under patent law.158  More 
specifically, the ECJ ruled that a violation of Article 102 requires abuse of the 
dominant position that is incompatible with the common market.159  Second, the 
ECJ stated that Article 36 justifies some restrictions in order to protect intellectual 
property, subject only to the limitations prescribed in Articles 34 and 35.160  In the 
end it was Article 36 that served as the balance against Articles 34, 35, 101 and 
102 as the Court held that neither Article 101 nor Article 102 of the TFEU 
prevents the holder of a patent granted by a member state from claiming on the 
basis of his patent right an injunction against the import of the protected products 
from another member state in which the products and their manufacturing process 
are not patentable.161 
In Merck & Co. v. Stephar BV,162 the ECJ went as far as calling the free 
movement of goods within the territory of the member states a “guarantee.”163  In 
this case, Merck had patented its hypertension drug, Moduretic, in all member 
states except Luxembourg and Italy.164  In Italy, it was unable to obtain a patent 
due to Italian Constitutional restrictions existing from the 1960s.165  However, 
Merck still sold its drug in Italy.166  The defendant, Stephar, purchased the drug in 
Italy in large quantities and resold them in the Netherlands at a much lower price 
than Merck’s price for the same drug in the same market.167  Merck asserted its 
Dutch patent right seeking to block Stephar’s importation of Merck’s drug for sale 
into the Netherlands.168  The ECJ ruled that Merck’s effort was incompatible with 
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EU law.169 
The Court granted Merck little sympathy since it was not able to secure a 
patent and was already marketing and selling its pharmaceutical in Italy.  
Throughout the case, the ECJ cited several opinions on the issue concerning a 
balance between Articles 36 on the one hand and Articles 34 and 35, on the other 
hand.170  Advocate General Reischl’s lack of sympathy may have rested on its 
assertion of what a common market requires, including:  
[T]hat it is one of the fundamental principles of a common market that any product 
which has been lawfully put on the market in a Member State must be allowed to 
circulate freely within the Community, unless the protection of a right or interest 
which is recognized in the Community legal order as being of greater value requires 
[otherwise].171 
Advocate General Reischl also contended that there is very little link 
between “patentability and price levels.”172  The ECJ stated that there were several 
other price factors that play a role in the price of pharmaceuticals.173 
In Pharmon BV v. Hoeschst AG, Advocate General Mancini of the ECJ gave 
one of its best explanations of the balance between Article 30 (ex 36), that 
provides protection for intellectual property, and Articles 34, 35, 101, and 102, 
which ensure the free movement of goods that may be at some level protected by 
national patent, trademark, or copyright law.174  Hoeschst, holding a patent for the 
pharmaceutical “frusemide” in three member states, including the United 
Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands, signed a licensing agreement with a 
DDSA, a British firm, that allowed DDSA the sole ability to manufacture, import, 
and sell frusemide in the United Kingdom.175  Shortly before the patent was to 
extinguish in the United Kingdom, DDSA violated the agreement by selling the 
pharmaceutical to Pharmon, a Dutch firm, whereby it was clear that Pharmon 
desired to penetrate the Netherlands market.176  Hoeschst immediately moved to 
assert its patent, under British law, and the associated licensing agreement to block 
Pharmon’s move into the Netherlands with Hoeschst’s patented pharmaceutical.177  
The Advocate General made three general and helpful pronouncements 
about the balance between intellectual property protection and trade restraint.  
First, the ECJ defined the principle of territoriality by stating, “That principle 
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170 This includes joined Cases 55/80 and 57/80, Musik-Vertrieb Membranmembran GmbH v. 
Gema 1981 E.C.R. 147; Case 24/67, Parke-Davis v. Probel, 1986 E.C.R. 55; Case 119/75, Terrapin 
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means that Community law cannot confer on the holder of a compulsory licence 
[sic] rights which may also be relied on in the territory of other [s]tates.”178  In 
other words, it is not the responsibility of the EU to create rights for patent holders 
outside of the state that grants those rights.  Second, the Advocate General, while 
citing Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug Inc.,179 stated that Article 36 allows for some 
derogation from the general principle that the law of member states cannot be used 
to limit the free flow of goods across the borders of member states.180  Third, the 
Advocate General described the principle of exhaustion or “extinction” of rights.  
The Advocate General stated: 
[I]ncorporated into “the body of Community law” the principle that rights and 
powers deriving from a patent are extinguished, and therefore may no longer be 
relied upon, when the protected product has been marketed—by the patent 
proprietor with his consent—in every country in the Community.  The reasons 
which led the Court to adopt that rule (known as the “exhaustion of the exclusive 
rights”) were set out in the judgment in Merck.181 
Having stated those three principles, the ECJ still had to wrestle with the 
decision at hand.  The Court found that Hoeschst could exercise its patent rights to 
block the introduction of the patented drug by Pharmon into the Netherlands since 
Hoeschst never gave consent for the product to be introduced into the 
Netherlands.182  The key fact relied upon the Court in finding that Article 36 could 
protect Hoeschst’s rights was that the license agreement did not allow DDSA to do 
anything but operate in the United Kingdom.  However, the ECJ left open the 
possibility that Hoeschst could not assert its rights to block the introduction of the 
drug if the firm had in some way consented to its marketing in the Netherlands.183 
b. Compulsory Licensing 
Article 34 has also been asserted by the Court to bar the practice of national 
authorities using their discretion to selectively choose those who might obtain a 
license for the right to import patented products.184  In Generics (UK) Ltd. v. Smith 
Kline & French Laboratories Ltd., the ECJ ruled that the British government could 
not carve out of Article 36 an exception to Article 34 to allow its Comptroller the 
power to grant a license of right to import patented products into the United 
Kingdom from both member and non-member states.185  Pursuant to the British 
Patents Act of 1977, the Comptroller could be petitioned to settle conflicts between 
firms on the issue of licensing for sale patented products when the raw materials 
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required for the patented product were made in other member states.186  In question 
here was the right to import the pharmaceutical “Cimetidine” whose raw materials 
were imported into the United Kingdom, where the product was finalized and then 
marketed inside the United Kingdom, in other member states, and in non-member 
states.187  Generics and Harris, two pharmaceutical firms, could not agree with 
Smith Kline & French Laboratories on a licensing agreement and petitioned the 
British Comptroller for a resolution.188  The Comptroller denied the license, and 
the British Patents Court upheld the Comptroller’s decision.189 
The ECJ treated the raw material of Cimetidine as if it were a finished 
product in regard to whether Article 34 applied and in doing so ruled that the 
Patents Act created the potential for a quantitative restriction for which Article 36 
could not save.190  The Court was firm in that the British Comptroller could not 
exercise its discretion to limit the importation of the raw material into the United 
Kingdom from both member and non-member states. 
c. EU Law Supplemental to National Law 
Article 114(1) allows the European Council to write regulations to 
harmonize law across the several member states in order to further the operations 
of the common internal market.191  In Spain v. Council of the European Union, the 
Spanish government challenged the ability of the EU to write supranational laws, 
in the form of regulations, in the field of patent law.192  Here, Spain contested 
Regulation 1768/92, which created a “supplementary protection certificate” for 
medical products that were subject to a national law patent right in order to give 
those medicinal producing firms an extended time period of protection.193  The 
European Council, invoking its powers under Article 95(1), promulgated the 
regulation upon evidence that the bulk of medicinal research was being conducted 
in the United States and Japan because of the more favorable intellectual property 
protection afforded by those countries.194  The problem that medicinal research 
firms faced was that although the patent for the product could be obtained 
relatively quickly, the license to market the product took longer and thus the real 
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time of the patent was shorter.195  The EU Council believed that the only way to 
improve the condition of medical research in the EU member states was to create 
the supplemental certificate that would attach to the national law-granted patent.196 
Spain challenged the regulation, arguing that the EU did not have the power 
to regulate commercial and industrial property pursuant to Article 36, which gives 
the member states the ability to protect such property.197  Although Spain cited 
several cases in support of its position,198 the Court stated, “The case-law has not 
excluded the possibility of the Community determining by legislation the 
conditions and rules regarding the protection conferred by industrial property 
rights, should such action prove necessary in pursuing its objectives.”199  The ECJ 
further stated that since the supplementary certificate was in addition to the patent, 
the latter of which is the sole province of national law, the EU Council was not 
infringing upon Article 36.200 
d. Language Requirements 
One can only imagine that in a trading bloc with twenty-seven member 
states, it is likely that differences in languages can inhibit the trade of products 
possessing intellectual property rights.  In BASF AG v. Prasident des Deutschen 
Patentamts, the ECJ upheld a provision requiring that patent applications be filed 
in the member state’s language against a claim by a patent holder that such a rule 
violated Articles 34 and 36 of the TFEU.201  Pursuant to the European Patent 
Convention (“EPC”), if the owner of a patent seeks patent protection in one of the 
EPC member states, the applicant must file an application in the language of the 
particular country in which the applicant seeks protection.202  If the applicant does 
not submit an application translated into the language of the EPC member state to 
which the applicant seeks protection within three months of filing with the 
European Patent Office, the country in which the applicant sought protection can 
declare the application void ab initio.203  BASF, the owner of a patent for a paint 
sealer for automobiles, after having been told by the German government that the 
patent would not be valid in Germany because the firm did not file an application 
in German, argued that the EPC’s language requirement amounted to a restriction 
that was not compatible with Articles 28 and 30.204 
Specifically, BASF contended that the costs of translating applications is so 
high that firms seeking intellectual property protection are forced to choose 
carefully the member states to which patent protection is realized and thus the 
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patent applicant will unfairly lose protection in some EU member states.205  BASF 
also argued that the language requirement forced an intolerable division of the 
European market in the face of Articles 28 and 30 by way of a property protected 
zone and a free zone whereby any innovator can copy the patented product.206  
According to BASF, there were two disastrous consequences of the division—that 
licensees and competitors in the free zone would commit an act of infringement if 
they exported the patented product from the protected zone into the free zone and 
that the patent holder would be unable to market the protected goods in the free 
zone for fear of a parallel import that would threaten the higher prices in the 
protected zone.207  
While finding no violation of Articles 34 or 36, the ECJ stated that the 
expense associated with filing a patent application in the appropriate language is 
just one of several factors, among many others, that a patent applicant must 
consider in determining in which countries to establish patent rights.208  The Court 
did not find the language requirement, or the consequences of the language 
requirement, to be a true obstacle to intra-EU trade.209 
e. Licensing Agreements 
In most instances, Articles 34, 36, 101, and 102 work together to promote the 
free movement of goods protected by intellectual property rights across the EU 
member states.  However, in Bayer AG v. Heinz Süllhöfer, the ECJ found a point 
of contention between Articles 34 and 101.210   
The facts of the case are compelling.  Bayer AG had obtained a patent for a 
process to manufacture panels and sheeting made up of foam materials and 
Süllhöfer had obtained a patent for a conveyor-belt system to manufacture foam-
based panels.211  Bayer AG, Süllhöfer, and a third firm, Hennecke, had engaged in 
a lengthy litigation process that was initially concluded by an agreement involving 
all three parties.212  Under the agreement, Süllhöfer granted Bayer AG and 
Hennecke a non-exclusive, free license to use its patented technology and the 
ability to sub-license the technology, in addition to rights to other protected 
property held in other member states.213  In return, Bayer AG granted a non-
exclusive, non-transferable license to its foam panel technology, waived any 
claims of infringement by either Süllhöfer or Hennecke, and agreed not to 
challenge the validity of the Süllhöfer patent.214  The agreement, which had 
provisions for royalties among the parties, effectively ended the litigation. 
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However, after Süllhöfer indicated a desire to terminate the agreement, the 
German courts were asked to determine whether the no-challenge clause in the 
agreement violated Articles 34 and 101 as an agreement that would limit the free 
movement of goods within the EU.215  Although the German court referred the 
matter to the ECJ on grounds involving both Article 34 and 101, the Court stated 
the case should be decided on grounds involving Article 101 and not Article 34 
since the agreement, a contract among private parties, does not amount to national 
legislation that has enacted a barrier limiting the free movement of goods.216   
The Court’s jurisprudence did not end with the simple division between 
Articles 28 and 81 and indeed the ECJ made several important pronouncements 
about the impact of Article 81.  First, the Court stated that an agreement that 
includes a “no-challenge clause” among parties supported by intent to end 
litigation does not infringe Article 101 so long as there are no other clauses 
restricting competition.217  Second, and related, the ECJ commented that Article 81 
does not create distinctions between agreements designed to end litigation and 
other agreements without such intent.218  Third, and in contrast, the ECJ stated that 
if the agreement in any way limited the freedom of action any of the parties, and 
the same provision restricting freedom also restricted competition, Article 81 
would be infringed.219  
Domestic courts also have had the opportunity to weigh in on the balance 
between intellectual property rights and the free movement of goods while 
interpreting the case law of the ECJ.  In Re Patented Bandaging Material, a 
German appellate court held that Articles 34 and 36 do not allow the licensee of a 
patented product to reintroduce the patented product in a member state that granted 
the patent rights when the patented products were first introduced in that same 
member state but were moved through another member state that did not grant 
patent rights.220 
In the case at bar, an American firm had licensed its bandaging product, 
which was protected by both American and German patents, to the defendant for 
sale in Germany.221  The licensee, however, exported the bandaging products to its 
subsidiary in Belgium, where patent rights for the bandaging products were not 
secured by the licensor.222  The subsidiary then reintroduced the bandaging 
products into Germany through the licensee’s second subsidiary.223  The German 
appellate court stated that consent to sell the products in Germany directly did not 
provide consent to reintroduce the same products through another member state 
and thus the exhaustion of rights doctrine did not apply since the transactions, 
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either from Germany to Belgium or from Belgium to Germany, were not 
voluntary.224  Furthermore, the German appellate court, after examining the 
jurisprudence from the ECJ, stated that the consent between the licensor and the 
licensee did not reach the threshold whereby Articles 34 and 36 would require 
intellectual property rights to be waived in favor of free movement of goods.225 
2. Analysis. 
The ruling in Parke-Davis should place intellectual right holders at ease at 
least in one regard.  Specifically, the enforcement of intellectual property rights is 
not a violation of the competition provisions of Articles 101 and 102.  For the ECJ 
to rule otherwise, intellectual property rights would be worthless.  In other words, 
the very fact that a party holds a patent, trademark, or copyright does not mean it 
has a dominant position and enforcement is not an abuse.  Few would argue that a 
patent holder should not be able to bar entry of goods made from a protected 
process without permission.   
The ECJ, in Pharmon, made it clear that the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights, especially in cases where the right holder did not consent to market 
their protected goods, is not a violation of Articles, 34, 36, 101, or 102.  It should 
also be noted that Hoescht, the plaintiff in Pharmon, may also have a breach of 
contract action against their licensee for taking the product into another member 
state without permission.  It is not clear as to whether this is an effective remedy.  
In this regard, intellectual property right holders should take special note of the 
outcome in Re Patented Bandaging Material which prohibits licensees from 
claiming protection under Articles 34, 36, 101, and 102 when they breach their 
licensing agreements and take the licensor’s goods to a member state that does not 
grant protection. 
However, the Merck decision presents a problem that is once again rooted in 
the lack of substantive harmony of patent law.  Member states are free to write 
their own substantive law creating intellectual property rights and, thus, it is 
possible that what is patentable in one member state may not be in another member 
state.  Problematically, if the right holder places their protected goods in the 
market place of a member state where protection does not exist, there is a 
significant chance that the price will be substantially lower and parallel importers 
will discover the opportunity for profit.  Essentially, in such a situation, the 
patent’s value is undercut even in countries where the patent holder has protection.   
If the EU were to adopt a Community-wide body of substantive patent law 
(or trademark or copyright law), these problems can be alleviated.  With such 
problems removed, the incentive to develop patent and market patented goods in 
additional member states might exist.  Another possible solution may be found in 
Spain v. Council of the European Union.  Since the ECJ upheld the Council of the 
European Union’s ability to draft laws that are supplemental to the domestic 
intellectual property law of member states, the Council could use this authority to 
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create intellectual property rights in member states that will not create them such 
as in the Merck case. 
B. Free Movement, Competition, and Trademarks 
1. Case Law 
a. Parallel Imports 
In the famous, precedent setting cases of Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug226 
and Centrafarm BV v. Winthrop BV,227 the ECJ determined that trademark and 
patent rights cannot inhibit the resale of a product trademarked and patented back 
into the country of origin where the rights were held once the right holder had 
agreed to market the product in a country where the importer (reseller) had 
lawfully purchased the product in the export country.  Sterling Drug and its 
subsidiary, Winthrop BV, held trademark and patent rights in the United Kingdom 
for an anti-urinary tract infection drug called Negram and marketed the product in 
the Netherlands.228  Centrafarm, the defendant in both cases, bought the drug in 
large quantities in the Netherlands and resold them in the United Kingdom at a 
lower price.229  When the product was resold in the United Kingdom by 
Centrafarm, it had the Negram trademark and it was the same product.230   
Sterling Drug and Winthrop tried to assert that their British trademark and 
patent rights could limit the ability of Centrafarm to resell the Negram product in 
the United Kingdom.231  The crux of the case was whether Article 34 would bar 
the use of these rights as  “quantitative restrictions on imports” or if these rights, as 
asserted, were within the confines of Article 36 thus allowing for the “protection of 
industrial and commercial property.”232   
Although the ECJ stated that member states can place some limitations on 
the parallel importer pursuant to Article 36, the Court held that to allow intellectual 
property rights to completely trump the parallel importer’s rights to resell the 
product in the country of origin would frustrate the Treaty.233  The Court stated 
that if the right holder was able to bar the reentry of the products, by asserting 
either trademark or patent rights, it would essentially be able to “control the outlets 
of the product in the Community.”234  Additionally, the Court believed that the 
purpose of intellectual property rights is not to interfere with the “principles of a 
Community system.”235  The Court likened these circumstances to those in 
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Deutsche Grammophon, in that the right holder had agreed to market its product in 
another member state.236 
The Court of Justice of the European Free Trade Association Court (“EFTA 
Court”) is no stranger to the same issues that have faced the ECJ regarding the 
exhaustion of intellectual property rights.  The EFTA Court is bound by the EU’s 
Directive 89/104/EEC on such matters.237  However, in Mag Instrument, the EFTA 
Court was faced with the question of whether the exhaustion of intellectual 
property rights, which was generally applied at a national level, should be applied 
on an international level when ECJ jurisprudence was silent on the matter.238 
Mag Instrument, the plaintiff in the case at bar, was an American 
manufacturer of flashlights which are sold around the world, as well as the owner 
of a registered trademark in Norway and many other countries for the “Maglite” 
brand.239  At the time of the case, Mag Instrument had only authorized one 
importer for Norway.240  The defendant had brought the trademarked flashlights 
into Norway through parallel import for sale.241  Mag Instrument filed suit against 
the defendant in a Norwegian court with a request that the defendant be prohibited 
from selling the Maglite flashlights.242 The chief argument by the plaintiff was that 
the defendant’s unauthorized act of bringing the flashlights into Norway for sale 
violated Article 7 of Directive 89/104/EEC.243  The defendant contended that 
international exhaustion of trademark rights is a requirement of Directive 
89/104/EEC.244 
After reminding a reader of its opinion that the EEA (and thus the EFTA 
Court) is bound by Articles 34 and 36 of the TFEU, the EFTA Court stated that, 
according to ECJ jurisprudence, Article 34 does not prohibit a trademark holder 
from asserting rights to block entry into the EEA of, nor does it prohibit the 
marketing of, trademarked products that are coming in from a non-EEA country.245  
Furthermore, the EFTA Court stated that the ECJ has decided that, at a minimum 
under Article 7 of Directive 89/104/EEC, the exhaustion of rights doctrine applies 
to the jurisdiction of any member state within the EEA.246  However, the EFTA 
Court also stated that the ECJ had not commented on whether Article 7 prohibits 
member states from writing national laws that allow for international exhaustion of 
rights.247  If the EFTA Court were to allow EEA member states to adopt 
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international exhaustion rules, then Norway could write laws that would allow the 
defendant to bring into that country any goods that have been sold anywhere in the 
world.  In the end, the EFTA Court held that Article 7 of Directive 89/104/EEC did 
not require member states to adopt only EEA-wide exhaustion rules and thus did 
not prohibit EEA member states from adopting such international exhaustion 
legislation.248 
Perhaps more important than the holding in Mag Instrument was the 
reasoning behind the decision.  According to the EFTA Court, international 
exhaustion promotes the interest of free trade and competition and, in turn, 
promotes the interests of consumers since many merchants will be able to bring 
trademarked goods into an EEA member state and prices for such goods will 
decrease.249  The EFTA Court also stated that the functions of a trademark, to 
allow consumers to identify products and force producers to establish goodwill, are 
not hampered by the international exhaustion of rights doctrine.250  Additionally, 
the EFTA Court stated that its decision was in line with EEA Agreement and the 
TRIPS Agreement.251   
A similar issue arose in Silhouette International v. Hartlauer whereby the 
ECJ held that member states cannot write legislation that provides for exhaustion 
of trademark rights as they attach to products placed outside the EEA even with the 
consent of the trademark holder, but also stated that Article 7 of Directive 
89/104/EC does not provide the trademark holder with a right to bar the reentry of 
parallel imports into a member state where the same goods are sold.252 
The fact pattern in Silhouette International was similar to that of Mag 
Instrument.  The plaintiff, Silhouette International, an Austria-based maker of 
expensive, high-end glasses and frames sold a consignment of “out-of-fashion” 
frames to a reseller in Bulgaria with express directions that they be resold in 
Bulgaria or former USSR republics.253  Hartlauer, the defendant and a firm 
successful at selling items at low prices, purchased the glasses and brought them to 
Austria and advertised their sale.254  Silhouette sought an injunction in the Austrian 
courts to prohibit Hartlauer’s marketing and sale of the trademarked goods, 
contending that such an advertising campaign would harm Silhouette’s high-end 
image.255  Specifically, Silhouette argued that it could assert its registered 
trademark in Austria to prohibit the parallel importation and sale of its trademarked 
goods since the consignment sold to the Bulgarian reseller was not a sale in the 
EEA and that trademark rights are not exhausted unless the goods have been 
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placed inside the EEA.256  After the Austrian trial court applied the doctrine of 
international exhaustion pursuant to Austrian law and found that Silhouette’s rights 
were exhausted as soon as the goods were on sale, regardless of where the goods 
are sold, the Austrian appellate court referred the matter to the ECJ for an 
interpretation of Article 7.257  Hartlauer did not argue that Directive 89/104/EEC 
required international exhaustion of trademark rights regardless of where the goods 
are sold, but only that member states are free to adopt international exhaustion 
principles.258 
The Court began its analysis by stating that Article 7’s exhaustion clause 
only applies to goods that are placed in the EEA.259  Directive 89/104/EEC, the 
Court said, is designed to safeguard the internal market, and there is a risk of 
allowing some member states to provide for international exhaustion while others 
did not.260  According to the Court, the possibility of differences in domestic law 
on this point could create distortion in competition among the member states, 
which is the absolute opposite of the EU’s mission.261   
However, and somewhat puzzling, the ECJ also left plaintiffs like Silhouette 
without a remedy in regard to the parallel importation reality.  When asked by the 
Austrian courts to determine whether a trademark holder can use Article 7 of 
Directive 89/104/EEC to gain an injunction against a third party seller from selling 
(and thus using the trademark) the goods in an EEA member state once the 
trademark holder voluntarily consented to a sale of those goods outside the EEA, 
the ECJ answered negatively.262  According to the Court, Article 7 imposes a limit 
on member states, not on individual parties.263 
b. Repackaging 
Parallel imports that are repackaged constitute one of the most challenging 
issues that affect the balance between intellectual property rights and the free 
movement of goods.  In Pfizer v. Eurim-Pharm GmbH, the Court stated that a 
trademark right cannot be asserted to prevent the entry of pharmaceuticals even 
when the importer purchases the right holder’s product and repackages it for resale 
in another state.264  The defendant in this case, Eurim-Pharm, purchased the 
plaintiff’s pharmaceutical, “Vibramycin,” and repackaged it for resale in 
Germany.265  The repackaging activity included a process whereby the “blister 
strips,” as created by Pfizer, were manually altered so that Eurim-Pharm could 
repackage them into smaller sizes.266  At no time were the actual “blisters” opened 
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but, when packaged, the consumer could see the “Vibramycin” name through the 
clear packaging created by Eurim-Pharm.267  
Pfizer held a trademark right under British law and was exporting/importing 
the product to Germany under the Pfizer name through a subsidiary.268  Therefore, 
this became a parallel imports issue since Pfizer had previously agreed to the sale 
of Vibramycin in Germany.  After citing the Centrafarm v. Winthrop case,269 the 
ECJ found that Article 36 did not create an exception to the Article 34 ban on 
quantitative restrictions, as applied in this case.270  Perhaps making Eurim-Pharm’s 
case stronger was its ability to show that the repackaging efforts were in line with 
the practices of German doctors.271  However, the ECJ did set some limits in its 
ruling.  It required that (1) the repacking be limited to the outer wrapping, (2) the 
original trade mark still be visible,272 (3) the new package must state that new 
packaging had taken place, and (4) the trademark right holder still controls where 
the product is sold.273 
However, in a more recent case also involving repackaging activity by 
Eurim-Pharm,274 the ECJ ruled that where the repackaging could affect the actual 
product, remove vital information or damage the reputation of the product 
manufacturer, a right holder could assert trademark rights to prevent the 
repackaging and resale of their product.275  Under such circumstances, Article 36 
creates an exception to Article 34.276  In this case, there was evidence that Eurim-
Pharm’s repackaging process obliterated the batch numbers printed on the original 
package, which could endanger consumer health.277 
The decision by the ECJ in Boehringer Ingelheim v. Swingward is perhaps 
the best articulation of the applicable rules in such cases.278  In this case, 
Boehringer Ingelheim brought suit against Swingward for trademark infringement 
after the latter had purchased several of the former’s medicinal products that were 
sold, under several trademarks, in several member states and then imported them 
into the United Kingdom after repackaging them.279  In repackaging the medicinal 
products, Swingward left the original trademark exposed, with the addition of 
Swingward’s name, repackaging the products in a way that required Swingward to 
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reproduce the Boehringer Ingelheim’s trademark.280  In some situations Boehringer 
Ingelheim’s trademark was not visible and only the generic name of the medicinal 
product was exposed.281  Boehringer Ingelheim opposed all three categories of 
repackaging, as well as the altering of the leaflets associated with the medicinal 
products, claiming that all of Swingward’s actions constituted trademark 
infringement and, thus, the repackaged products could not be parallel imported into 
the United Kingdom.282 
The ECJ’s decision is not only important for the rules it set forth in regard to 
repackaging, the free movement of goods, and parallel imports, but also for its 
articulation of the power and meaning behind a proprietor’s trademark.  The Court 
began by stating that the purpose of a trademark is to signify the origin of a 
product and when a product is repackaged in a parallel import such a guarantee of 
origin is jeopardized.283  Because of that threat, the ECJ remarked that what is 
most important in determining whether trademark infringement exists is whether 
the repackaging is prejudicial to the trademark and not whether there are actually 
negative effects realized in the market place.284  However, the Court also 
commented that a trademark holder cannot claim there is a threat to origin of 
source and reputation merely because the trademarked goods have been 
repackaged, as to do so would create an infringement of Article 34 and Directive 
89/104/EEC as a disguised restriction on trade.285  The trademark holder can assert 
trademark rights to prohibit the parallel importation of a repackaged good if the 
original condition of the product is altered.286 
The ECJ, while still attempting to strike a balance between intellectual 
property rights and the free movement of goods, articulated a duty on behalf of the 
parallel importer to give notice to the trademark holder that the repackaged product 
is being placed on sale in a member state.287  The parallel importer must also 
supply the trademark holder with a sample of the repackaging before it goes on 
sale.288  According to the Court, this protective measure will allow the trademark 
holder to determine whether the original product is being harmed or whether the 
presentation of the packaging could harm the trademark owner’s reputation or the 
reputation of the product.289  However, the Court did state that if the repackaging is 
necessary for the parallel importation to be successful and the trademark 
proprietor’s interests are protected, the repacking is likely to be allowed.290  The 
burden is on the parallel importer to show that its repackaging does not harm the 
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reputation of the trademark holder or its product.291 
The ECJ was specific as to what could harm the reputation of the trademark 
holder.  The Court stated that the repackaging could harm the trademark owner’s 
reputation if it is “not defective, of poor quality, or untidy” so long as it detracts 
from the image of the mark.292  In addition, if the parallel importer does not affix 
the trademark to the exterior repackaging, or wholly or partially obscures the 
trademark, or reprints the trademark in capital letters, the parallel importer also 
threatens the trademark holder’s reputation.294 
c. Trademark Similarity 
Trademark infringement cases that arise from conflicts between Articles 34 
and 36 are not limited to situations whereby one firm makes the product and 
another firm buys it and resells it in another state (parallel imports).  Indeed, 
problems can arise when similar trademarks are used for different products.  In 
Terrapin Overseas Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie CA,293 a German, plaster products 
firm under the name of Terranova294 tried to assert its trademark right to block the 
entry of pre-fabricated houses marketed by a British firm, Terrapin, who also held 
a trademark for their business name in the United Kingdom.295  In the German 
trademarks register, the objects of the German right holder were listed as 
“Manufacture of dry prepared plaster, construction work and trade in building 
materials.”296 
The ECJ, in Terrapin, found that the German right holder could block the 
entry of the British-named product as long as there are no restrictions on the 
product entering Germany.297  The ECJ thus found an exception within Article 30 
(ex 36) to Article 28 (ex 30) whereby two similar names in similar industries are 
trademarked by different states.  Advocate General Mayras noted that the Terrapin 
firm could market its products in Germany under a different name.298  The Court’s 
main rationale for its opinion focused on protection of the consumer to justify the 
validity of the Article 36 exception to Article 34.299 
In a 1990 case, the ECJ further defined border between permissible and 
impermissible conduct in regard to the assertion of intellectual property rights and 
the Treaty.  In S.A. Cnl-Sucal NV v. Hag GF AG (Sucal), the Court stated that 
since the Treaty was not designed to lay down an extensive set of rules governing 
intellectual property, it was up to the Court, and has been for some time, to outline 
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the interests of the TFEU.300  
In Sucal, the Court wrestled with the question of whether the trademark of 
“HAG,” held by the German decaffeinated coffee maker “HAG Bremen,” could be 
asserted against its competitor “HAG Belgium” when the latter entered the 
German market.301  HAG Bremen contended that its brand of decaffeinated coffee 
was superior in quality and processing and that the HAG Belgium label would 
confuse consumers in Germany into buying a lesser quality product.302  According 
to the Advocate General, the legal question was whether the enforcement of HAG 
Bremen’s trademark in Germany would violate Article 34’s “prohibitions or 
restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit.”303  In contrast, Article 36 
allows for the protection of “industrial and commercial property.” 
The Advocate General returned to the basic premise that “[t]he exclusive 
right conferred on the owner of intellectual property is exhausted in relation to the 
products in question when he puts them into circulation anywhere within the 
common market.”304  Further, the Court added that a right holder cannot rely on 
the domestic intellectual property grant to block the importation of a product that 
has been legally marketed in another state.305  
However, these traditional issues were met by a new twist: the “common 
origin” principle.  The common origin principle is based on the idea that it is 
possible that two similar or identical marks having common ancestry could be 
owned by different persons in different states.306  Under the common origin 
principle, neither of the right holders may assert protection to keep the other from 
marketing its product in the other’s state.307 
The Advocate General went to great lengths to describe the value of a 
trademark308 in finding that the doctrine of common origin did not apply.309  In its 
ruling, the Court believed that the trademarks were too similar and could lead to 
confusion by the consumer due to both sound and design.310  The Court stated that 
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there was a fine line between the prohibitions in Article 34, where a broad view 
could be dangerous, and the allowances under Article 36, where a narrow view 
could be likewise as dangerous.311   
d. Counterfeit Goods 
In Adidas AG, the ECJ was faced with a decision of whether a national law 
prohibiting the disclosure of a counterfeiter of goods caught by customs officials at 
the Swedish border should prevail over a EU regulation to the contrary.312  The 
Swedish customs officials had believed that a declarant of goods attempting to 
bring them into the country was engaged in the counterfeiting of sports apparel, in 
violation of Adidas’ Swedish trademark rights.313  Adidas demanded the identity of 
the declarant/owner of the goods so that the former could bring an action against 
the latter for trademark infringement.314  The Swedish authorities refused citing a 
national law prohibiting the conveyance of such information on the grounds that it 
violated the protections afforded to data protection.315 
Regulation 3295/94 states that “the decision granting the application by the 
holder of the right shall be forwarded immediately to the customs offices of the 
member states which are liable to be with the goods alleged in the application to be 
counterfeit or pirated.”316  This provision of the Regulation is designed to support 
the trademark holder’s right across the member states.  Indeed, Article 1 of the 
same regulation orders customs officials to take action when goods are suspected 
of being counterfeit or pirated.317   
The ECJ’s decision could be construed to hold that the Swedish law was in 
conflict with the regulation.318  After considering the concerns of the Swedish 
legislature that a person’s identity, even that of a counterfeiter, should be 
protected, the Advocate General stated that these concerns should yield to the 
needs of the trademark right holder “when there are already serious suspicions that 
the goods which are subject to customs control are not genuine . . . . [and, the] 
competent administrative authorities consider that those goods ‘correspond to the 
description of the counterfeit or pirated goods.’”319 
e. Private Agreements  
Article 101 can be used to prohibit an agreement between two private 
entities, one of which holds an intellectual property right, if that agreement 
potentially restricts trade.320  The ECJ ruled that a private agreement between two 
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firms, that includes a no-challenge clause violates Article 101 if, although, 
designed to remove the possibility of confusion by consumers in a given market, 
the agreement creates an imbalance of responsibilities between the two parties.321  
The applicant, BAT, at one time held a trademark right in Germany for its sales of 
“curly cut tobacco,” used for pipe smoking, under the name “Dorcet.”322  
However, BAT allowed its trademark to expire and even asked the German 
government to remove it from the trademark registry.323  Segers, a Dutch firm, 
attempted to sell its tobacco product, “fine cut tobacco,” a close cousin of “curly 
rolled” and used for hand-rolled cigarettes, in Germany under the name “Toltecs,” 
which in the German language could cause confusion with Dorcet.324  BAT 
objected to the use of the Toltecs name and, in order to avoid lengthy and 
expensive litigation, Segers signed a delimitation agreement that included a no-
challenge clause removing the possibility that Segers would later challenge the 
agreement with BAT to limit its tobacco sales to “curly cut tobacco.”325 
Segers’ primary argument was that the private agreement possessed a 
mistake and desiring to sell fine cut tobacco rather than curly cut tobacco.326  The 
European Commission later found for Segers, concluding that the agreement 
signed by the two parties amounted to a violation of Article 101.327  The ECJ, in 
rejecting most of BAT’s arguments, found that the agreement created too many 
restrictions on the ability of Segers to export their tobacco product into Germany 
and that all BAT had to do to perform the contract was to agree not to challenge 
Segers’ importation of fine cut tobacco.328  Additionally, the ECJ found evidence 
that BAT had interfered with the relationship between Segers and the latter’s 
distributors through the agreement.329  Just as important, however, the ECJ hinted 
that the agreement might have been acceptable with fewer restrictions and a greater 
balance of responsibilities.330 
f. Damage to Reputation  
The ECJ returned to its line of thinking found in Class International when 
deciding Parfum Christian Dior SA v. Evora BV (hereinafter Christian Dior) by 
stating early in the decision that, in order to assist in the uniform application of EU 
law, the national courts have a duty to refer cases to the Court, and inclusive within 
the category of national courts is the Benelux Court, which was designed to serve 
as a court for Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and Belgium.331 
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In Christian Dior, the ECJ returned to the issue of the rights of a trademark 
owner under the European trademark Directive (89/104/EEC).  Plaintiff Christian 
Dior, a French firm and the owner of several trademarks and copyrights, developed 
and produced several lines of perfume products and marketed them through 
wholly-controlled subsidiaries and allowed for retailing on a selective basis.332  
Defendant Evora was a retailer that resold Christian Dior products retail outlets 
and used the Christian Dior marks in order to advertise the products.333  The 
plaintiff sued Evora BV for trademark infringement in a Dutch court contending 
that Evora’s marketing of the plaintiff’s trademarks harmed the marks’ “luxurious 
and prestigious image.”334  Specifically, Christian Dior sought an order to prohibit 
Evora from using its trademarks in its publications, catalogs, brochures, 
advertisements, and reproductions.335 
Article 7 of Directive 89/104/EEC, the chief directive on trademarks within 
the EU, allows for a trademark holder to prohibit the use of its trademarks, even 
when the holder has voluntarily placed the product in the member state, when the 
user of the mark changed the condition of the goods or has impaired the goods 
after they are placed on the market.336  Christian Dior argued that Article 7 should 
include the “mental image” of the goods so far as that when the user of the mark 
uses the goods in a way that impairs the image and allure of the luxury surrounding 
the goods, the trademark holder should be able to limit the use of its mark.337  
Evora, in contrast, asserted that Articles 34 and Article 36 curtail the ability of 
Christian Dior as a trademark owner to limit Evora’s use of the mark for the 
products it sells.338 
The ECJ stated that the exhaustion of rights, as established by Articles 34, 
36, and the Directive, includes the ability to market and advertise trademarked 
goods once they have been sold into the marketplace and thus the user of the 
trademark has the right under EU law to garner the attention of the consumer 
public in order to sell more of the same goods in the future.339  The Court 
conceded Evora’s argument that without such an extension of the exhaustion of 
rights doctrine in place, it would be very difficult to commercialize goods that are 
protected by intellectual property rights.340 
The ECJ acknowledged, however, the concerns of trademark owners, such as 
Christian Dior.  The Court stated that in situations like the case in point, courts 
must strike a balance between the interests of the trademark owner who seeks to 
protect the strength and allure of its mark and the interests of resellers who might 
use the trademark in a way that damages the reputation of the goods and advertise 
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the goods in ways that are customary to that particular industry sector.341  The ECJ 
found that even when the reseller obtains the goods by way of a parallel import and 
markets those trademarked goods along with other items that, although 
comparable, are not of the same perceived quality as the trademarked goods in 
question, the trademark owner cannot prohibit the reseller’s advertising use of the 
trademark unless the advertising seriously damages the reputation of the goods.342  
According to the ECJ, this is also true if the advertising scheme is different than 
that of the trademark owner’s approved retailers.343 
A more difficult question in Christian Dior arose in regard to both trademark 
rights and copyrights associated with the owner’s packaging materials and whether 
the trademark owner can assert rights under Article 36 to limit the use of the 
packaging material or whether the trademark owner would be prohibited in doing 
so under Article 34.344  The ECJ stated that, in principle, the exercise of 
intellectual property rights in such a case would be a violation of Article 34 as a 
quantitative restriction, and thus, the only question left was whether the assertion 
of rights could be excused under Article 36 pursuant to the protection of industrial 
and commercial property clause.345  The ECJ held that Article 36 does not allow 
for an exception to allow a right holder to block the use of packaging material that 
is protected by both trademark and copyright, as the user who lawfully obtains the 
goods has a right to further commercialization of the products.346 
Peak Holding v. Axolin-Elinor AB sheds additional light on the rights of 
trademark owners under Articles 5 and 7 of Directive 89/104/EEC, which is the 
directive on trademarks.347  Peak Holding, the plaintiff, was a Danish firm that 
owned the “Peak Performance” trademark for clothing and other accessories in 
Sweden and many other countries.348  The defendant, Axolin-Elinor, was a 
Swedish firm that had obtained Peak Performance gear through both parallel 
import activities and re-import activities.349  In addition to reselling the Peak 
Performance garments, the defendant also advertised the clothing items at a fifty 
percent discount.350  This led the plaintiff to file suit in a Swedish court requesting 
that Axolin-Elinor be enjoined from further use of the plaintiff’s marks, that 
Axolin-Elinor pay damages, and that the clothing items held by the defendant be 
seized and destroyed.351  There was disagreement between the parties as to the 
source of the goods.352  Plaintiff argued that the goods were offered for final sale 
only in Copenhagen at the plaintiff’s shops and the defendant argued that the 
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source of the goods comprised several independent resellers.353  Similar to the 
argument made by Christian Dior, Peak Holding argued that the marketing 
methods chosen by Axolin-Elinor infringed Peak Holding’s trademark rights.354 
In contrast to Evora’s more passive approach in Christian Dior, Axolin-
Elinor made several arguments in opposition to Peak Holding’s exercise of 
trademark rights under Directive 89/104/EEC.355  First, the defendant argued that 
the trademarked goods were voluntarily placed in the EEA when the goods cleared 
customs and the plaintiff intended to sell the goods in the EEA.356  Second, 
Axolin-Elinor argued that the goods were placed in the EEA when the goods were 
offered by independent resellers.357  Third, the defendant argued that the goods 
were placed in the EEA when the plaintiff began marketing the goods in the 
plaintiff’s retail stores.358  And fourth, the goods were placed in the EEA market 
when the plaintiff sold a consignment of garments to an exclusive reseller with 
express instructions that the exclusive reseller not be able to resell the goods in 
countries other than Russia, Slovenia, and a small quantity in France.359  Although 
Peak Holdings contended that the exhaustion of rights doctrine did not apply when 
its trademarked goods were merely offered for sale, it also argued that, even if the 
exhaustion doctrine did apply, the doctrine was lifted and the trademark rights 
were restored when the unsold quantities were returned to the plaintiff’s 
warehouse.360 
While engaged in its analysis, the ECJ stated clearly that Directive 
89/104/EEC created a complete harmonization of the rules relating to the rights of 
trademark holders and that a uniform definition of “put on the market,” which is 
found in Article 7 of the Directive and is also the point in time whereby exhaustion 
of trademark rights occurs, is necessary.361  The ECJ held that merely placing the 
goods in the EEA and offering them for sale does not meet the standard of putting 
the goods on the market, and thus, does not give non-trademark owners the ability 
to use the trademarks when selling the goods.362  Instead, the Court held that goods 
are placed in the market when a first sales transaction occurs.363  According to the 
Court, merely importing the goods is not consistent with the Article 7 definition of 
placing the goods in the market to trigger the exhaustion doctrine.364 
The Court was left with the issue of whether the agreement between Peak 
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Holdings and the exclusive reseller, in conjunction with that agreements’ 
stipulation that the trademarked goods would only be sold in certain countries, met 
the definition of placing the goods on the market under Article 7 of Directive 
89/104/EEC.  The ECJ stated that the exhaustion of rights requires some form of 
consent by the trademark holder, and when the trademark owner consents by 
agreement to provide a consignment of clothing to an exclusive reseller, the goods 
are voluntarily placed in the market and the exhaustion of intellectual property 
rights occurs precluding the trademark owner from interfering with the resale of 
the goods after they are in the possession of the exclusive reseller.365  It does not 
matter that the agreement between the trademark owner and the exclusive reseller 
limits the territory by which the trademarked goods may be resold.366 
2. Analysis 
Simply stated, if the holder of a trademark voluntarily places its protected 
products in a member state, a parallel importer may bring the goods back into the 
originating member state without fear of intellectual property rights serving as a 
barrier.367  This is true even if the parallel importer repackages the goods or 
decides to retail them at a discount rate or through a discount retailer.368  Free 
movement principles are also espoused by the European Free Trade Area Court 
and thus the entirely of the European Economic Area.369 
One can only imagine the potential damage that can be done to the reputation 
of a trademark holder if repackaged goods prove to be faulty in some way or are 
sullied by a discount retailer.  Despite those concerns, however, the ECJ still 
prefers free movement principles.  This philosophy does hold true to the promise 
of the common market that free movement practices will make the European 
economy more efficient be allowing market participants to find ways to reduce 
costs while making a profit.370  Therefore, if a parallel importer believes that 
goods, be they protected by intellectual property rights or otherwise, can be 
repackaged and sold at a profit it will be able to do so as long as no damage to the 
reputation or integrity to the trademark occurs.  Such principles may also stimulate 
different marketing strategies by the right holders in markets where parallel 
imports can be spawned.  In other words, the holder of the trademark rights may 
repackage the goods for profit in markets where it makes sense to do so.  An issue 
for greater exploration, but beyond the scope of this work, is at what point the 
repackaging does significant harm to the trademark’s reputation and/or at what 
point the repackaging has damaged the goods subject to the trademark allowing for 
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369 See Case E-2/97, Mag Instrument, Inc. v. Cal. Trading Co. Norway, Ulsteen, 1 C.M.L.R. 331, ¶ 
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an Article 36 barrier to arise to parallel importing. 
The potential for damage to the reputation of a trademark is when protected 
items are sold by, and advertised by, discount retailers.  One the one hand, 
trademark holders may look at the situation from the viewpoint that these goods 
would not have been sold at all because they are out of vogue and the discount 
venue is one last chance to make profit.  On the other hand, it may be that the 
discounted, out of vogue goods serve as a rival to newer, in vogue goods that 
might suffer in sales due to the availability of the discounted items.  Trademark 
holders in this situation may seek to advertise the differences between the in vogue 
and out of vogue items in order to protect the newly produced items from the older 
items.  The Christian Dior and Peak Holding cases set a foundation for the 
discount retailing market within the European Economic Area.371 
The common ancestry of trademarks is a challenging reality in the EU.  On a 
continent with dozens of languages, trademarks of similar sound and design are 
likely to arise in ways that are innocent of infringement.  In such cases, the ECJ 
has still maintained its preference for the free movement of goods.372  At worst, 
one party may not be able to use its preferred trademark in a particular member 
state in order to avoid confusion, but that same party cannot be blocked from 
bringing the goods into the member state if the party is willing to use another 
trademark.  
A limitation on the free movement of goods is the possibility of counterfeit 
goods.  The ECJ does not allow Article 34 to limit attempts by right holders to end 
the movement of counterfeit goods, but allows for the discovery of the names of 
those who have engaged in counterfeiting activities. 
C. Free Movement, Competition, and Copyright 
1. Case Law 
a. Parallel Imports  
Perhaps the best articulation by the ECJ of the rivalry between intellectual 
property law and the mission of the TFEU is found in Deutsche Grammophon 
Gesellschaft v. Metro-SB-Grossmarkete.373  This case not only observed the 
balance between national intellectual property rights, in this case German 
copyright law, and the prohibitions on trade restraint, but also the potential for 
intellectual property rights to create unacceptable trade restraints in violation of 
Article 101 of the TFEU.  The German plaintiff, Deutsche Grammophon 
(“Deutsche”) held copyrights pursuant to German law and distributed records by 
agreement to retailers through contracts stipulating that the retailers must abide by 
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Deutsche’s price schedule.374  The agreements also required that the records, if 
acquired by a third party, could only be imported from another country with 
permission from Deutsche Grammophon.375  The evidence indicated that Deutsche 
only gave consent if the third party agreed to the price structure.376  In order to 
maintain a tight grip on the distribution of their records abroad, Deutsche would 
only distribute throughout Europe through its subsidiaries.377 
The French distribution subsidiary owned by Deutsche was Polydor, which 
was later purchased by Metro-SB-Grossmarkte (“Metro”).378  Metro distributed the 
records in issue until a disagreement over the price structure dissolved the business 
relationship.379  Soon after, Metro began to purchase Deutsche’s records through 
the new French distributor and resold them in the German market at a price below 
what Deutsche had set through its price structure agreements with other German 
distributors.380   
Deutsche sought an injunction against Metro, arguing that the German grant 
of the copyright was infringed by Metro’s activity.381  Although the Advocate 
General cited precedent that stated that “rights granted by a Member State to the 
holder of a patent [would not be] affected by . . . Articles 85(1) and 86 of the 
[E.E.C.] Treaty,”382 it nonetheless held that the agreements and assertion of 
copyright could not withstand Articles 101 and 34 and found the agreement and 
German law in violation of the TFEU.383 
The ECJ focused its decision on the potential power of the copyright holder 
to cordon off the market at virtually all levels and have almost absolute control of 
interstate marketing through the enforcement of that copyright.384  The ECJ also 
stated that the territoriality principle, whereby the copyright holder could 
theoretically assert his power throughout the member state in which he held his 
right, cannot conform to the TFEU’s prohibition of such power under Article 
101.385  The Advocate General Roemer’s own words best state the rivalry between 
the assertion of territoriality and the TFEU: 
In view of this situation there is in fact much to be said for the view that since the 
bounds of the territoriality principle are so uncertain it does not form part of the 
substance of the protection.  In any event this applies to the particular problem of 
the present proceedings, i.e., a situation in which, as the [German Court] has held, a 
legal person connected with the holder of the rights has marketed the goods in 
question abroad.  Here it should be decisive that the purpose of the industrial 
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protection rights was fulfilled when the goods were first marketed, since it was 
possible to use the monopolistic opportunity for gain.  On the other hand, it would 
undoubtedly go beyond the purpose of the protection rights conferred if the holder 
was permitted to control further marketing, in particular to prohibit re-imports, and 
free trade in goods was prevented.  Thus in view of the proviso in Article 36, the 
fundamental aims of the Treaty and the principles of the Common Market, and in 
spite of the guarantee of the subsistence of industrial property rights, in a situation 
such as that in the present case it may be held that the rights have been 
extinguished, i.e., the exercise of the distribution rights is precluded.386 
The Advocate General Roemer’s basic premise was that under Articles 36 
and 101, the territoriality principle cannot be used to inhibit the free trade of 
goods.387  The price agreement was held to constitute an inhibition against free 
trade under Article 101 and the assertion of German trademark rights would not be 
permissible under Article 36.388 
It is often the case that imported and exported goods are covered by more 
than one source of intellectual property rights.  In Dansk Supermarked v. Imerco, 
the ECJ entertained a case that involved the parallel importation of goods that were 
protected by both copyright and trademark rights.389  In this case, Imerco, a group 
of Danish hardware merchants, had commissioned the creation of a 
commemorative china dish service set that was to be sold to Imerco members 
only.390  Imerco and the British manufacturer of the china dish sets additionally 
agreed that any of the substandard china dish sets could be marketed by the British 
manufacturer, but only in Britain and not in Denmark or any other Scandinavian 
country.391   
The china dish sets were protected by both copyright, in regard to the 
creative work of the design, and trademark rights, in regard to the Imerco name 
affixed on the dish sets.392  Dansk Supermarked, a supermarket chain in Denmark, 
obtained several china dish sets in the United Kingdom and offered them for sale 
in Denmark at prices substantially lower than those associated with the shipment 
that was originally intended for Imerco members.393  Imerco, upon discovering that 
Dansk Supermarked was selling the china dish sets, asked the latter to cease the 
sale of the products; Dansk Supermarked refused and Imerco instituted 
proceedings against the firm.394   
At first glance, Dansk Supermarked seemed a traditional parallel import 
case, whereby the proprietor of intellectual property rights has voluntarily allowed 
the sale of a protected good in a member state (the United Kingdom) and is 
protesting, through the exercise of those rights, the reintroduction of those goods 
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into another member state (Denmark), when the proprietor has also consented to 
their sale.  
The ECJ began by stating that the Danish national courts cannot prohibit the 
parallel importation of the china dish sets since Imerco voluntarily placed them in 
the EU market pursuant to Articles 34 and 36 of the TFEU.395  Unique to the case 
was a Danish law that required firms marketing products to comply with Danish 
competition rules that required the recognition of intellectual property rights.396  
However, the ECJ held that the Danish competition rules merely reflected a 
prohibition on the infringement of copyrights and trademark rights, but that the 
Danish competition rules could not prohibit the parallel importation of the china 
dish sets.397 
In Warner Brothers v. Christiansen, a more technologically advanced case, 
the ECJ held that firms who sell video cassettes of movies into the member states 
can invoke their copyrights to prohibit their remake and resale after the video 
cassettes have been lawfully sold or rented.398  Here, Warner Brothers held a 
copyright, recognized in several member states, for a James Bond film (and several 
other films) reproduced on video cassette for purchase and rental and marketed 
them throughout the member states.399  The defendant, Christiansen, had 
purchased the James Bond video cassette and advertised copies for sale in 
Denmark with Danish subtitles.400 
Although the ECJ found that Warner Brothers had clearly determined which 
markets to sell its copyrighted product, its rights were not exhausted at the sale of 
the cassette within the particular market, and therefore, Warner Brothers could 
assert copyright protection to enjoin the further duplication under Article 36401  
The Court noted that the great majority of use of video cassettes in the EU was 
through rentals and that the copyright holder should have the ability to limit the 
exploitation of its investment.402  Furthermore, in comparison to the Cinetheque 
case,403 the Court found no difference between a sale of the film and the rental of 
its reproduction.404 
b. Royalty Payment 
In Musik-Vertrieb Membran GmbH v. GEMA, a bizarre set of facts gave rise 
to a prevailing interest found within Article 36 over the competing interests of 
Article 34.405  The ECJ heard two cases together with similar fact patterns whereby 
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an organization of composers representing those with copyrights to music tried to 
enforce those copyrights to ensure the standard royalty payment recognized in 
Germany.406  GEMA, a German organization was entitled to an 8.0% royalty on 
each record sold by the plaintiffs in Germany.407  The plaintiffs, however, received 
permission to sell the records in Germany by the British counterpart of GEMA, 
MCPS, with a royalty payment of 6.25%.408  GEMA argued that it was entitled to 
the difference between the two royalty payments.409 The plaintiffs argued that if 
such an argument were accepted, it would run afoul of Article 34, which bars 
restrictions on imports.410 
The ECJ ruled that Article 36 allowed for the use of German law to force the 
plaintiffs to pay the difference in royalty payments since the composers, not the 
plaintiffs that manufactured the records being imported from the United Kingdom 
to Germany, held the copyrights.411   
Royalties again were the subject matter in G. Basset v. SACEM.412  In G. 
Basset, the ECJ was asked to determine whether a national copyright management 
organization recognized under French law could require a supplementary 
mechanical reproduction fee levied on the public performances of copyrighted 
sound recordings.413  SACEM, the French organization that controlled the 
copyrighted works, sued Mr. Basset, an operator of a discotheque, for back 
payment of the agreed-to supplemental royalty.414  Basset argued that such a 
royalty violated Articles 34, 36, 101, and 102 of the TFEU.415  Basset also 
contended that SACEM had a de facto monopoly over the sound recordings in 
regard to contract and that this created a dominant position in the market that was 
also abused due to the size of the traditional royalty, which amounted to 6.60% of 
the discotheque’s gross revenues, and the supplementary royalty, which amounted 
to 1.65% of the gross revenues.416 
According to the ECJ, all sound recordings are products bound by the 
requirement that goods move freely between member states under Article 34 and 
any national legislation that would allow a national copyright management society 
to block the movement of those copyrighted sound recordings would violate 
Article 28.417  However, the ECJ also stated that Article 36 allows member states 
to write legislation to protect industrial and commercial property, including 
copyrighted works, even if the legislation allows for the enforcement of licensing 
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provisions.418  With these black-letter statements behind it, the Court found that the 
supplementary royalty was not assessed against the acts of importing or marketing 
the goods from one member state to the next, but instead, was assessed against the 
public use of the copyrighted work at discotheques, radio stations, or juke-
boxes.419  The Court also found that the royalty was merely compensation to the 
author for the use of the copyrighted work and was not assessed against the volume 
of records that were sold.420 
In the end, the ECJ found that no violation of Articles 34, 36, and 102 were 
present.421  Specifically, in regard to Articles 34 and 36 the Court found no 
violations despite the fact that national law allowed the National Intellectual 
Property Right Association to institute either royalty even if the member state in 
which the sound recordings were in public use did not require the same types of 
royalties.422  Addressing the claim by Basset that the composite royalty rate was an 
abuse of a dominant position, thus, a violation of Article 102, the ECJ found that it 
was up to the national courts to determine whether the required royalty was 
abusive and since the French court did not believe them to be abusive.423  The ECJ 
adhered to the finding but warned, however, that significantly high royalties could 
constitute the abuse of a dominant position.424 
c. Domestic Distribution Limit 
Articles 34, 36, and 56 were used to challenge a French ban on the 
distribution of copyrighted movies under copyright in Cinetheque S.A. v. 
Federation Nationale des Cinemas Francais.425  At issue in this case was a French 
law that banned the selling or renting of video cassettes of any film which is 
simultaneously being show or one year from the date of the authorization 
certificate granted for the film.426  Within the one-year period, Cinetheque began to 
reproduce a film that was currently in circulation in France and to sell copies to 
vendors, who would, in turn, sell them to consumers.427  The plaintiffs 
immediately sought an injunction in French courts to stop the duplication and 
distribution of the film.428  Cinetheque then brought a suit arguing that the French 
statute violated the above the TFEU’s provisions.429 
The ECJ found that the French law did not violate Articles 34 and 35 since 
importers and domestic (French) traders were being treated equally and therefore, 
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there was no discrimination against imports.430  Additionally, the French law did 
not give distributors the ability to take advantage of the differences in legal 
requirements across the member states even though the Advocate General Slynn 
found that no similar state law existed.431 
Advocate General Slynn also found that Article 56’s ban on any restrictions 
on the freedom to provide services within the EU was not violated by the French 
law since the prohibition on the duplication and distribution for one year did not 
amount to a “restriction.”432 
d. Broadcasting 
Coditel v. Cine-Vog, factually, is a relatively easy case to show the power of 
a copyright holder when executing a license with another party that allows for 
distribution of a film only in one member state.433  Coditel was a collection of 
Belgian cable companies that had contracted with Cine-Vog to distribute and show 
copyrighted films controlled by the latter, but only in the Belgian market.434  
Coditel had allowed the broadcasts to be picked up by German viewers, in breach 
of the agreement with Cine-Vog, and Cine-Vog sued Coditel for back payment of 
royalties.435 
Coditel argued that Articles 34, 36, 56, and 101 were violated, and 
specifically, that the agreement posed an equivalent restriction on the free 
movement of goods and services, and that the agreement constituted an attempt by 
Cine-Vog to distort competition.436  The ECJ made short shrift of the case holding 
that the mere requirement in a copyright licensing agreement that limits the 
geographical scope of broadcast rights does not violate Articles 34, 36, 56, or 101 
and that Article 36 permits a member state to enforce agreements that allow for the 
protection of commercial and industrial property as an exception to Article 34.437  
The Court expressed sympathy for the concerns of Cine-Vog in regard to the 
importance of film distribution in the EU, whereby copyrighted works need to be 
appropriately subtitled.438  To address such concern in a license agreement was not 
an attempt at distortion, and thus, Article 101 was not violated, per se, the Court 
declared.439  The ECJ did make it clear, however, that national courts must inquire 
as to whether the exercise of copyrights found within licensing agreements actually 
distort competition.440 
Articles 34, 36, 101, and 102 are not the sole provisions of the TFEU 
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involved in the discussion of the balance between intellectual property rights and 
the free movement of goods.  Article 56 of the TFEU provides for the free 
movement of services.441  Article 106 of the TFEU requires that any revenue-
producing entity created by a member state that is given exclusive rights must 
adhere to the principles found in Articles 18, and 101-109.442  In ERT v. DEP, the 
ECJ made several comments about the ability of a member state to create a media 
crown corporation with monopolistic power over television and radio 
broadcasts.443 
The Greek government had created the Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation 
(“ERT”) to maintain exclusive broadcasting over television and radio of virtually 
all sounds and images broadcasted within Greece for general reception, or by 
special closed or cable circuit, or any other form of circuit, and the setting up of 
radio and stations and ERT was given the power to produce and exploit by any 
means radio and television broadcasts.444  Despite the exclusive rights granted to 
ERT, DEP and the mayor of a Greek city launched a television station to broadcast 
television programs.445  When challenged by ERT, DEP claimed that the Greek 
grant of authority for ERT violated Articles 34, 36, 101, and 102 of the TFEU.446 
The ECJ did not expressly address whether Articles 34, 36, 101, and 102 
were violated.447  Instead, it answered several questions posed to it by the Greek 
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courts on the subject of monopoly power regarding broadcast rights.448  According 
to the ECJ, its previous case law did find that the Treaty prevents member states 
from removing television and radio broadcasting from the sphere of competition 
and providing one entity to provide those services, but the way in which the 
monopoly-empowered entity is organized or exercised can infringe Articles 101 
and 102.449  The Court stated that television broadcasts are covered by the TFEU 
provisions concerning free movement of services and the materials used in 
television broadcasting, namely the sound recordings, films, and other products, 
are subject to the rules on the free movement of goods.450  The ECJ further stated 
that if the monopoly is granted exclusive authority to import, rent, or distribute 
broadcasting material, no violation of Article 34 exists unless the monopoly-
empowered entity, either directly or indirectly, engages in discriminatory practices 
between domestic and imported broadcast materials to the detriment of the 
imported materials.451 
In regard to the free movement of services, the ECJ provided a parallel rule 
to the rule regarding free movement of goods and held that the creation of a 
monopoly-empowered broadcasting entity itself is not a violation of Article 56 of 
the TFEU so long as the entity does not discriminate between domestic and 
foreign-based (yet within the EU) broadcast services, to the detriment of the 
latter.452  According to the ECJ, the fear is that without a guarantee that the 
broadcasting entity would carry broadcasts from other member states, the 
monopoly-empowered entity would favor its own programs.453 
On the subject of competition law, the ECJ made it clear that Articles 101 
and 102 are applicable to monopoly operations created by member states and that 
these entities will be treated as a separate undertaking from the member state that 
birthed it.454  Continuing, the ECJ stated that it is possible that member state 
created monopolies can have a dominant power in the market place and can abuse 
that power under Article 102.455  The ECJ remarked that member states are not free 
to force the monopoly-empowered entity to engage in competition rules violations 
under Articles 101 and 102.456 
e. Reproduction of Copyrighted Material 
In a landmark case, in fact a consolidation of three cases collectively called 
the “Magill TV Cases” that perhaps best explains the remedial powers held by the 
European Commission, the ECJ upheld the ability of the European Commission to 
order copyright holders to disseminate their information when their copyright 
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amounts to a an abuse of a dominant position under Article 102.457  In The Magill 
TV Cases, three television broadcasters asserted their copyrights against Magill TV 
as the latter took the schedules printed by each of the broadcasters and 
consolidated the schedules into one magazine for consumers to purchase in Ireland 
and Northern Ireland of the United Kingdom.458   
Under the two-step process required to find a violation of Article 102, a 
dominant position and the abuse thereof, the ECJ found that the television 
broadcasters abused a dominant position.459  The dominant position was 
substantiated by the fact that the majority of households in Ireland and as much as 
forty percent of households in Northern Ireland could receive broadcasts by the 
three television networks.460  Furthermore, to allow the networks to assert their 
copyrights would, in effect, give them “de facto monopoly” over the publication of 
weekly television listings, placing firms like Magill, that wanted to create a new 
product, in a state of economic reliance.461  Article 36 could not save the assertion 
of the copyrights.462 
2. Analysis 
A common thread exists between copyright cases and patent cases in regard 
to fees that firms may have to pay to be able to successfully move products from 
one member state to another.  In the Musik-Vertrieb and Basset cases, the ECJ held 
that those using copyrighted sound recordings even if the royalty schedules are 
different for different member states must make royalty payments.463  The ECJ, 
however, maintained its free movement principles and stated that once the royalties 
are paid, the sound recordings can be moved from one member state to when 
consent exists.464  The holding in these cases are similar to the holding in BASF, 
above, where the ECJ held that language requirements for patent applications did 
not violate Article 34.465  The common thread in these cases seems to be that as 
long as all parties, and their protected goods, are treated the same, member states 
are permitted to have unique laws that might create an intellectual property 
patchwork across the EU.  Expenses such as royalty payments and costs associated 
with preparing patent applications are not barriers since all parties operating in the 
member states that have these conditions are regulating only within their member 
states. 
The Cinetheque case is the only case in this line that is perplexing, but only 
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because of the possible effects.  From a pure quantitative restriction viewpoint, the 
ECJ is allowing for a limitation pursuant to French law where after-market 
distribution of movies is barred for one year from the premiere date of the film.466  
Theoretically, the law only applies in France but would apply to French films and 
films produced across the EU but premiered in France.  What remains to be seen is 
whether this harms the after-market film distribution industry if one or a handful of 
member states truly dominate the film industry.  These few countries could enact 
similar laws and significantly limit the after-market film distributors’ chances at 
profitability. 
Similar to the concerns associated with the secondary market for film 
distribution, the irregular goods industry gained significantly by the ECJ’s decision 
in Dansk Supermarked.  Although the plaintiffs had a significant interest in 
protecting their copyright (and trademark) in regard to value, consent to market 
irregular goods in another member state allows for a parallel import opportunity.  
Member states that want to allow for protection of copyrights (and trademarks) in 
regard to their value could require a consumer protection identification mark on the 
goods that they are “irregular.”  Such a maneuver could allow for the price of the 
copyrighted and trademarked goods to remain at traditional levels.   
The Magill TV Cases are perhaps the best example of consumer protection 
that stems from Articles 34 and 102.  The ability to allow a third party publisher to 
create a master schedule makes it easier, and thus cheaper, for television viewers in 
the EU to find their way to the show they desire.  The television networks that 
published the primary schedules certainly have an interest in making sure that the 
republication of their schedules in the form of a master schedule is accurate.  The 
ECJ, in a sense, created a new industry making television viewing easier for those 
living in mass markets.  The case is, to a certain degree, out of line with traditional 
notions of copyright protection that would usually allow for an injunction against 
unauthorized use of copyrighted material, in this case, a primary television 
schedule. 
Intellectual property rights are designed to stoke innovation, creativity and 
economic development.  However, the decision in ERT v. DEP seems to allow 
governments to stifle innovation, creativity, and economic development, and 
perhaps worse, create conditions for censorship.  In ERT v. DEP, the ECJ stated 
that it is not a violation of the TFEU for governments to remove broadcasting from 
the realm of competition and, thus, allowing for state control of media.467  It seems 
ironic that the EU, which is founded on an economic liberalism philosophy, would 
condone such a possibility, which also prohibits television shows and movies from 
entering into a member state. 
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D. Free Movement, Competition, and Trade Secrets 
1. Case Law 
The cell phone industry continues to be an intellectual property frontier.  Cell 
phone technology can involve all forms of intellectual property, including patent, 
copyright, trademark, and trade secrets.  In T-Mobile NV v. Raad van besuur, the 
ECJ ruled that the revelation of trade secrets among competitors that leads to an 
agreement that restricts competition can lead to an infringement of Article 101.468 
The T-Mobile case, factually, sounds like a traditional European 
“competition” case or American “antitrust” case.  The five operators of cell phone 
service in the Netherlands met to discuss the reduction of standard dealer 
remunerations for post-paid cell phone subscriptions and, according to the 
evidence discovered in the Dutch courts, confidential information was discussed 
and exchanged and a date for the agreement was adopted.469  The Dutch courts 
found that the five parties had engaged in a concerted effort in violation of Dutch 
law and Article 101 of the TFEU, and all five parties were fined for their action.470   
The ECJ made several statements about the potential violation of Article 101 
pursuant to a willing exchange of corporate information among competitors.  
According to the ECJ, the purpose of Article 101 is to identify forms of collusion 
among competitors and collusion is present when there is coordination and 
cooperation among competitors occurs instead of risk-oriented competition.471  
Article 101, the ECJ declared, prohibits agreements maintaining an anti-
competitive object as well as agreements realizing anti-competitive effects.472  
Once the anti-competitive objective is identified, Article 101 is breached and there 
is no need to explore whether anti-competitive effects have been felt by the market 
place.473 
The ECJ also commented on the exchange of information among the 
competing parties that would constitute an Article 101 violation.  The ECJ stated 
that no business information, either directly or indirectly, should be relayed 
between and among competitors that would influence the activity of actual or 
potential competitors, nor should any information be disclosed about the nature of 
products or services offered by the competitors.474  Moreover, if the exchange of 
information between and among competitors removes uncertainty in market 
operations, Article 101 has been breached.475 
The ECJ held that national courts must apply a presumption that Article 101 
has been infringed, thus shifting the burden of proof to the alleged infringers, when 
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competitors willingly meet and exchange vital business information and remain 
active in the market place.476   
2. Analysis 
The sharing of business information may be the next significant challenge 
for member states, consumers, and victimized competitors.  Firms holding trade 
secrets can work together to insulate themselves from the forces of competition 
and injure consumers and other competitors that are not privy to the same 
information.  Such information can be shared quickly, privately, and easily.  The 
reader of this work would notice that Article 81 does not arise as often as its sister 
Articles including 34, 36, and 102.  However, member state governments, as well 
as the EU government, will have to become more vigilant against such abuse in the 
form of private agreements among competing firms. 
The most challenging part of this enforcement is likely to be the 
determination of whether the sharing of information has led to an agreement, and 
then whether the agreement among the competitors has created anti-competitive 
effects.  The ECJ’s ruling in T-Mobile does state that the sharing of such 
information, directly or indirectly, gives rise to an Article 101 violation.  Policing 
this matter will be made easier due to the ECJ’s holder that there exists a 
presumption that Article 101 has been violated upon proof of shared information. 
V. ANALYSIS OF FREE MOVEMENT, COMPETITION, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 
An analysis of the jurisprudence of the ECJ on the balance between the 
protection of intellectual property law on one hand and the free movement of 
goods and undistorted competition on the other hand seems to favor the free 
movement of goods and undistorted competition.  The ECJ in the above cases 
seems to err on the side of preventing intellectual property right holders, whether 
the right is vested in a patent, trademark, or copyright, from asserting their rights 
under national law to prevent the possibility of trade restraint.   
This is not to say that nationally-granted intellectual property rights are 
worthless.  Indeed, the ECJ has stated that the national intellectual property right is 
unyielding, but only if the right holder manufactures and markets the product 
within the member state granting the right.  However, once the right holder’s 
product leaves the territory, the doctrine of Community-wide exhaustion of rights 
(i.e., regional exhaustion) prevails in most cases.  The ECJ will not uphold a 
national law inhibiting the free movement of goods once the right holder has 
acquiesced, whether explicitly or implicitly and however mildly, such as is the case 
of parallel imports, to the sale of the protected product in another market. 
This reality poses a challenging dilemma for firms with substantial 
intellectual property rights.  The European Commission’s decisions and the 
opinions from the ECJ show that firms must think very carefully about placing 
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their protected products in other member states, as the threat of parallel import is 
significant.  The Advocate General Reischl’s comment in the Merck v. Stephar 
decision—that there is very little relationship between patentability and price—is 
clearly unfounded as many cases show the real value in parallel importing.477  The 
reader of these cases can only imagine the financial resources that an intellectual 
property right holder will spend in litigation trying to protect these rights against a 
tide that is clearly against them.  Such litigation costs, both within the EU and 
internationally, help reveal the true value of such rights as assets to be protected.  
In other words, right holders would not spend these resources if the stakes were 
low. 
Making this dilemma even more challenging is the possibility that 
international exhaustion becomes the norm.  The jurisprudence of the ECJ makes it 
clear that regional exhaustion is the norm, but the ECJ has not stated that regional 
exhaustion of rights within the EU is the limit.  The EFTA Court has been more 
direct and, after examining the same ECJ jurisprudence in Mag Instrument, held 
member states are free to adopt international exhaustion rights if they so desire.478  
Firms that are heavily dependent upon their intellectual property rights should 
begin to plan for the possibility of international exhaustion as the EU becomes 
more comfortable with regional exhaustion and the member state governments also 
press for such limitations.  However, if international exhaustion were to become 
the standard in regard to the balance between intellectual property rights and trade 
restraint, the ECJ and the EFTA Court would have to better coordinate their 
precedents.  Otherwise, this would be a threat to harmonization in the EU and 
EEA.  Given the Swiss Federal Court’s decision in Kodak, there may be a battle 
between strict national exhaustion and international exhaustion on the European 
continent.479  If Switzerland is able to improve its level of foreign direct 
investment through its intellectual property laws, other member states may 
abandon the current trajectory and retreat to national exhaustion, which would 
certainly be more popular with firms possessing intellectual property rights. 
There are exceptions that the ECJ has carved out of the TFEU—such as 
allowing a right holder to assert rights having the effect of trade restraint—aside 
from the traditional exhaustion doctrine.  The ECJ will allow the assertion of 
intellectual property rights to block the movement of goods if consumer health is 
jeopardized (i.e., if repackaging could contaminate the product), or if the products 
might lead to consumer confusion (i.e., two related products with similar names), 
or if there will be serious damage to the reputation of the right owner.  If, however, 
a trademark right holder suspects serious interference with its rights in these 
circumstances, the right holder is wise to exercise its right to demand a sample of 
the packaging and challenge the method of the parallel import. 
The ECJ has stated that royalty payments are due right holders and parties 
who are tied to such agreements making them responsible for the payment of 
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royalties are not able to invoke Articles 101 or 102 as a barrier to payment.  
Additionally, when agreements between a right owner-licensor and licensee 
specify the geographic range of broadcast rights for the licensee, the licensee 
cannot hide behind any of the Articles and refuse to adhere to those limits.  
However, these exception cases are rare and those seeking to protect their products 
and market them in another member state will not often be able to rely on the 
intellectual property rights.  Indeed, in the case where two product names are 
similar, if the marketer of one of the products is willing to change the name of the 
product, the opposing right holder may do little to prevent the product’s 
importation into the member state that has granted the rights.   
Despite these bright-line rules, the ECJ has still left a void in the area of 
trademark law and to a lesser degree patent law and copyright law.  In the 
circumstance where two competing firms, each with intellectual property rights 
from two different member states (e.g., Country A and Country B), and they 
attempt to enter a third member state (e.g., Country C) with identical trademarks, 
there is no solution in EU law as to which firm has prevailing rights in the third 
country (Country C).  Instead, if any solution exists, it must be found in the 
domestic law of that third member state.  This is a void that can only be addressed 
by way of legislation from the European Commission or European Council. 
Additionally, a right holder will not be allowed to dominate information and 
the ECJ will allow for the free flow of information when one or a few parties are 
able to abuse a dominant position in regard to television media. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The EU, and its law, has come a long way in sixty years and a legally united 
Europe may not be far away.480  The momentum toward unification and integration 
seems to be linear.481  Without question, this body of law will continue to evolve.  
But the law seems to be evolving consistent with the international trend whereby 
intellectual property rights are weakened to accommodate the interests of the 
world’s consumers and the ever-increasing number of free trade agreements. The 
decisions by the ECJ and its sister court, the EFTA Court, could prove to become 
the playbook by which other judicial organs follow as they are created to deal with 
conflicts arising from future trade agreements.  Given the experiences of the ECJ 
and EFTA Court, the world’s countries should have less fear as to how any trade 
court would handle disputes and the associated leaders should have greater faith in 
these tribunals.  
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